**Program on Extremism**

The Program on Extremism at George Washington University provides analysis on issues related to violent and non-violent extremism. The Program spearheads innovative and thoughtful academic inquiry, producing empirical work that strengthens extremism research as a distinct field of study. The Program aims to develop pragmatic policy solutions that resonate with policymakers, civic leaders, and the general public.

**About the Author**

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*The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the Program on Extremism or the George Washington University.*
Executive Summary

Following the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s overt military surge on June 10, 2014, which took over Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, a strict interpretation of Shari’ah was imposed on the locals. “Diwan Al-Hisba”—Chamber of Morality Police—was immediately established and soon took on an organized form. Hisba members were deployed in public venues such as markets, parks, and even schools where they sought out violations of the religious code and imposed penalties varying from fines for minor misdemeanors, to execution in more severe cases. This paper attempts to demystify the work of Hisba in Mosul. While other works have extensively highlighted Hisba in other ISIS-controlled areas such as Raqqa, Aleppo, and Anbar, namely the work of Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, this paper shall present accounts from trusted eyewitnesses and reflect on the social aspect of the practice. This paper also examines the psyche of Mosul’s society prior to the Islamic State surge, taking a closer look at the various preexisting interpretations of social conservatism and whether, and if so how, the surge influenced the concept of Hisba.
Mosul before ISIS

The conception of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the origin of its roots in the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul remain topics of debate. Mosul witnessed anti-coalition and anti-government insurgency in the immediate aftermath of regime change, and much of that insurgency was affiliated with al Qaeda and other strands of armed jihad whose end goals, after “defeating the infidels and apostates,” revolved around establishing a Shari’ah-abiding state.¹ Thus, any date following April 9, 2003, does not offer an accurate illustration of Mosul before the phenomenon of overt religious violence.

Going back to Mosul in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s offers a different view of the city. The city was vibrant with art, culture, coffee shops, and social events. Segregation between men and women was rare and there was no pressure, legal or social, to live according to Shari’ah-leaning conservatism.² It should be noted, however, that there were hints of popular Islamist approval after the “Al-Shawaf” uprising in 1959.³ Though Al-Shawaf’s revolt was led by Arab nationalists, the Communist-leaning Iraqi President Abdul Kareem Qassim’s excessive authorization of violence—which caused scores of deaths and unprecedented chaos in the city—led to an embrace of the then-marginal Muslim Brotherhood network in Mosul.⁴ The influence of this network was not visible beyond a slight increase in the number of mosques constructed with private money and donations. The Muslim Brotherhood camp remained restricted to a few influential families who passed on their commitment to future generations.⁵ Heavy monitoring by the Baath Party limited their effect on the city for the next three decades.

However, these families would exercise their influence nearly three decades later, when Saddam Hussein implemented the “Faith Campaign” in 1993.⁶ The Faith Campaign included an overhaul of Islamic teachings in school and universities, the launch of higher education Islamic institutions, and the creation of a new set of regulations aligned with Islamic virtues, such as banning alcohol sales in public and closing nightclubs. While several analysts and experts contest that the Faith Campaign set the foundation for Salafism in Iraq before the invasion, the Campaign focused on the Iraqi Baath Party’s version of Arab National-centric Islam in what appeared to be an attempt to win over the religious camp in the midst of severe economic sanctions that were fueling public frustration.⁷ In Mosul, the campaign offered a rare platform to the aforementioned affluent pro-Muslim Brotherhood Islamists whose influence was already evident as the sanctions following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait worsened.⁸

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² Ma’an Abdel Qader Al Zakariya, “Mosul in the olden days: Mosul’s cafes and casinos between the thirties and seventies of the past centuries,” Bayt al Mosul, August 4, 2013.
⁴ Ibrahim Khalil Al-Alef, “The history and present of the society of Muslim Brothers in Iraq,” Blog of Dr. Ibrahim Al-Alaf, April 1, 2015.
⁵ Al-Sawaf, Al-Ni’ma, Al-Habbal and Al-Chalabi remain among the most influential Mosuli Muslim Brotherhood families.
The rapid change was particularly acute in the realm of “virtue”: within three years the majority of Muslim women in Mosul donned the hijab, Friday prayers were attended in masses, and mixing between males and females was semi-prohibited. Social conservatism was not enforced by law and those who opted for a different lifestyle were not subjected to penalties. But, with the continuing influence of the Faith Campaign and its pioneers, any objection to the newfound definition of virtue was highly frowned upon socially. The phenomena became the social norm, and individuals were praised or scorned based upon their degree of obedience. While the Iraqi government had a hand in facilitating social conservatism through its promotion of the Faith Campaign, in certain cases the Baath Party did not tolerate interference with personal choice. For example, while two of the Faith Campaign’s most distinctive features were the closure of nightclubs and the prohibition of alcohol in public venues, private alcohol consumption continued to be tolerated.

The Faith Campaign era’s social norms remained in Mosul after the fall of Saddam in 2003. One could argue that certain ISIS practices in Mosul (such as the enforced niqab for women and the prohibition of alcohol) are not viewed as oppressive measures, as the society the Islamic State inherited as a result of the Faith Campaign was already relatively conservative compared to Mosul’s recent past. That being said, it should be noted that there is no evidence suggesting the Faith Campaign pioneers served as incubators for the Salafist ideology behind ISIS, as some reports have suggested. In fact, the majority of families in Mosul affiliated with the Faith Campaign or the Muslim Brotherhood were targeted by jihadists after 2003.

The first signs of enforced Shari’ah, or Hisba, appeared in late-2004, when a decree distributed in Mosul University threatened all female students with “harsh consequences” if they failed to meet the requirements of the Muslim dress code. Unverified attacks on Christian women in local markets were circulated in the media and on the streets. This particular decree was never attributed to a certain group, nor were the perpetrators ever identified. However, given Mosul University’s tight security measures at the time and the difficulty of accessing the campus if one was neither on the faculty nor a student, it was believed that the act was carried out by non-organized religious students who were expressing personal rejection to what they perceived as “deviance” from Mosul’s social norms.

In December 2007, another decree addressed to Christian women was distributed on the University campus as well as secondary schools, public offices, hospitals, and markets. The warning threatened severe punishment to anyone violating the Islamic dress code and demanded

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9 For example, in 1996, a female college professor at Mosul University was chastised by her male colleagues for her choice of dress. After continuous harassment, she filed a complaint with authorities. The professors in question were rebuked and received a notice that they would be dismissed if the act was repeated.
10 Despite grievances at the hands of ISIS, a significant number of people interviewed believe the niqab enforcement is positive. This can also be deduced from social media comments and debates that defend the code, despite being imposed through threat.
11 Omar Mahmood Abdullah Al-Saydali, father of the current Minister of Education of Iraq, was the Faith Campaign’s most active non-Baathist. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein he remained active within the ranks of the Islamic Party of Iraq. He was assassinated by jihadists in 2005.
13 Ibid.
14 Following the fall of the regime and introduction of Internet and satellite television, women in Mosul began conforming to fashion trends, accessories, and non-traditional styles of hijab.
Christian women conform to the hijab. The decree was attributed to “The Islamic Iraqi State,” the first incarnation of the group that would later be called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. This round of warnings was taken seriously amid chaotic violence and near complete absence of security in Mosul. Such threats remained consistent for the next six years or so. It is worth noting that while verbal threats were made to “deviant” men, no significant decrees or incidents of violent attacks targeting men were confirmed.

**Mosul, the Capital of “Wilayat Ninewa” of the Caliphate**

Following weeks of heavy fighting in the outskirts of Mosul, Iraqi army units abandoned their posts in the city center. Militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria secured their hold of both the eastern and western parts of Mosul within 72 hours. What seemed to be a minor military setback for the Iraqi army on June 8, 2014, turned into a major defeat for the country by June 10; Mosul was no longer under Iraqi sovereignty. Several narratives regarding the identity of the invaders quickly spread through the city. Some referred to them as “rebels” unrelated to any jihadist organization, who aimed to salvage the Sunni-majority of Mosul from the sectarian policies of then-Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki. Another narrative claimed the armed militants were members of the “Al-Naqashbandi Army,” the military arm of the Arab Baath Party led by the Vice President of the Revolutionary Leadership Council during Saddam’s era, Izzat Ad Douri. It would take less than a week of rumors, legends, myths, and confusion for Mosul’s residents to identify their new rulers: ISIS.

On June 13, ISIS began distributing what it called “Wathiqat Al-Madina,” or the Bill of the City, door to door. The document asserted the presence of ISIS in Mosul, and conveyed the organization’s seriousness in governing the city in accordance with strict Shari’ah. The following are some of the significant points related to Hisba included in the 12-article document:

- **To those asking: who are you?** We say we are the soldiers of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, from the seeds of Islam we have taken upon us the task to revive the glory of the Islamic Caliphate and to end the grievances and injustice of the Safavid viper that has choked our families and brethren; we vow to amputate this snake and its followers.
- **Our stance on tombs, shirk [polytheistic] shrines, and pagan sites,** follows what Prophet Muhammad said: “Do not leave a statue but obliterated or a tomb but effaced.” It is prohibited to consume and trade alcohol and smoke.
- **To the virtuous women:** Allah Allah in modesty and wide loose jilbab, stay in your homes and do not leave them only in cases of necessity. That is guidance of the Mothers of the Believers and the dignified female companions, may Allah be content with them.

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16 One widely spread story in Mosul was that the armed militants were replacing the current Iraqi flag with Saddam’s post-Gulf War flag of 1991.

17 A copy of the original document can be found in Appendix A.

18 A way of asserting the indisputable importance of an issue.

19 A wide gown that reveals neither skin nor physical shape.
Despite the Bill’s circulation, there were no sightings of enforced obedience for nearly a month. Friday sermons, now given by clerics appointed by ISIS, did however use severe language when discussing practices deemed a violation of Shari’ah.

As with most Islamist stands on virtue, women received the vast majority of the focus: “staying at home” was emphasized repeatedly in sermons.20 Other causes that received repeated attention included the prohibition of alcohol and smoke (cigarettes and shisha). In mid-July, ISIS militants ordered owners of women’s clothing stores to halt sales of the merchandise they had, as it did not conform to the Islamic dress code. The following week, thousands of niqab sets were distributed to stores and an official decree ordering all women to don the niqab and gloves was issued.

During this period, the first Hisba vehicles used by ISIS militants began roaming the city. The majority of cars had been seized from Mosul’s public sector when the city collapsed. Hisba vehicles are often seen today in public places such as markets, parks, coffee shops, schools (including Mosul University), and hospitals.

![Figure 1. “Al-Hisba” vehicle in Mosul](image)

**Social and Class Breakdown of Hisba in Mosul:**

According to eyewitnesses and news outlets, at present the majority of ISIS militants hail from the outskirts of and rural villages far from Mosul’s center.22 “Sometimes Arab [non-Iraqi] fighters are with them. They are armed and they carry canes around with them, sometimes hitting people. They wear [customary] Afghan attire.”23 Witnesses claim that the “Arab” fighters in Hisba ranks are often more “humane” when approaching civilians, in stark opposition to the cruel and humiliating treatment at the hand of local Iraqis. As one eyewitness told the author directly, “They do not look pious like the Arab fighters. Sometimes they harass women even. But they enjoy publicly humiliating people from Mosul. They resent us.”24

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21 Al Ghadeer TV, “Youth uses cigarette trick to kill 3 ISIS hisba (religious police) in Mosul,” September 5, 2015.
23 Fadel Al Nashmy, “This is how I live in the Caliphate state: exclusive story from Al Mosul to Al Nahar,” Al Nahar, December 18, 2014.
24 Male eyewitness residing in Mosul, interview with author via Skype, 2015.
This phenomenon was repeated by every eyewitness contacted for this paper. The recurring nature of this narrative suggests a trend: the revenge of the underdog, namely social outcasts from rural areas whom often felt like second-class citizens, ridiculed and looked down upon by urbanites. Whether its residents are motivated by feelings of marginalization or a lack of identity, rural Ninevah constitutes a serious security dilemma. Studies and books written about these areas are often subjective in nature, and do little to explain why residents hailing from these areas have often rejected state laws. While apocalyptic and jihadist narrative has attracted scores of non-Iraqi fighters from the Arab world, Europe, and even the United States, the appeal of ISIS among local Sunnis is confined to two explanations: the “Islamization” of Iraq since the mid-1990s as a result of Saddam Hussein’s Faith Campaign and/or “Sunni rejection” of a sect-centralized Shia Iraqi government. Both explanations bear elements of truth, but neither explain why the majority of ISIS fighters, supporters, and enthusiasts are from rural Mosul, areas inhabited by tribal groups of different ethnicities that were not privileged during the Baath regime and were not known to be either religious or active during the Faith Campaign. Fieldwork research into the anthropologic and social aspects of the rural villages and towns where the majority of ISIS volunteers and fighters come from should be encouraged to better understand this phenomenon.

“Diwan Al-Hisba”

In the Al-Maj-mu’a Al-Thaqafiya neighborhood, opposite Mosul University’s main campus, ISIS uses one of many confiscated pieces of real estate as the base for Diwan Al-Hisba. The diwan, or police force, operates as an official bureau with employees in charge of documenting the daily violations observed by the patrolling Hisba units in the city. When a person is issued a notice, they must either accompany the Hisba patrol unit to the diwan, or set a date for a Hisba “hearing” at the diwan. Once there, staff document the details of the incident: time, place, violation, and type of penalty. The “List of Ta’zir Penalties” (Fig. 2) includes violations with fixed penalties previously set by “Diwan Al-Quda’at,” the Judiciary House, in accordance Shari’ah or jurisprudential diligence.

Other violations deemed more “serious,” such as adultery, fornication, homosexuality, murder, theft, and refusal to pay zakat are referred to the Judiciary House for a judge’s verdict.

According to eyewitness accounts and a detailed report from Mosul Eye, penalties are often subjective in Mosul. Cases of smoking and drinking caught by Hisba have often led to flogging despite the Ta’zir penalty issued by Diwan Al-Hisba stating that such violations are to incur fines and/or advice only. “There seems to be local variation in the degree of accurately implementing the penalty in many cases. It differs from Mosul to Anbar, but it is hard to say specifically why,” says Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, an expert on official ISIS documents. This subjective issuing of Hisba penalties arguably plays into the notion that Iraqi Hisba members are driven by vengeance. However, at this point it cannot be verified with certainty whether severe penalties are the result of the urban/rural struggle in Mosul, or merely judged by context.

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25 Districts such as Tal Afar and Rabi’a have a history of cooperation with jihadist groups.
Figure 2. Unpublished “List of Ta’zir Penalties,” courtesy of Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi\textsuperscript{27}

Figure 3. Sample of a notice for “shaving beard”\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27} Complete translation in Appendix B
\textsuperscript{28} The penalized in this document sent a copy of his notice. Name has been sealed for security reasons.
Famous Hisba Incidents Over the Past 18 Months in Mosul:

- On September 24, 2015, 63-year-old restaurant owner “Karim Al-Umar” was flogged for repeatedly keeping his business open during prayers. During the flogging, he allegedly uttered “words of insult toward Islam and the Prophet.” As the Judge (Qadi) was present at the scene, his verdict was changed to “heresy,” and he received the death penalty by beheading immediately.29
- At an unspecified date in 2015, a young woman was brought to the main public square in Souk Bab Al Toub for flogging after being charged with fornication. The flogging appeared “too gentle.” The girl then managed to escape without being persuaded by Hisba, who claimed “The prophet said of those who commit fornication and flee out fear, then you may let them be.”30 The bizarre scene was later said to have been orchestrated in an effort to give a merciful face to ISIS militants.
- In July 2015, a 19-year-old man was executed for treason after Hisba found images of a burning ISIS vehicle on his smart phone during a “random” check.31 However, details revealed later indicated that the young man took photos of an ISIS convey burning from a coalition strike and then uploaded the images to a Facebook page, oblivious to the fact the page was administrated by ISIS sympathizers, who reported him. Hisba then claimed to have carried out a random inspection on smart phones that day and found the images. In the face of these details, Hisba accusing him of providing coordinates to the International Coalition.

Conclusion

Diwan Al-Hisba in Mosul is not a spontaneous imposition of virtue on society, but rather an organized bureaucratic system used to oppress and humiliate locals. The authority granted to those within ISIS’s ranks is exploited to, what appears to be, settle social scores between those from rural Mosul and the city’s urban residents. Beyond creating an environment of fear, the impact of Hisba has been a further widening of the gap between different ethnic and social components of Ninevah, which in turns hinders liberation and guarantees the continuity of enmity among the residents, the main source of power for ISIS in all the lands under the organization controls.

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29 Ibid.
30 Eyewitness to the incident, interviewed by author via Skype, 2015
31 First cousin of the victim in interview with the author in July, 2015.
Appendix A:

(وثيقة المدينة)

الحمد لله ناصر المؤمنين وحذام المجاهدين والصدأ والنور على إمام المجاهدين وقائد الجهاد المحتفل وعلى الله
وصحو حماة الملاك وحمي الربين ومن تبعهم بإحسان إلى يوم الدين أما بعد:

نحن الأمة الإسلامية عامة وسود الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام بفتح الله المسلم الذي ينزل الله عليه عباده
المجاهدين فيها فهن الدولة الإسلامية ترانيات انتصاراتها بفضل الله، فهي مشروع الخلافة الوعود و.stdin المشروع...

وأما القبلة بحسب الله عزوجل يثبت ورقيها تثبت، ولا تصرف الكبوس والزوج، ولا الرضوع والزروع; فقصيها واحدة لا
غير وهي إقامة سلطان الله في الأرض ويست نفوذ الشريعة وكي شمعة القابض من أروج المسلمين...

وعلو شطر طلبته يبيرنز تحيا لمشاعر الأصيلة وأهلنا وأحبنا وعراقلنا في ولاية نويواركة:

1. تابعون العالم الإسلامي بهذه الفتوحات الرائعة ونكاية بحري الأسرى من سجون الغابة الرفعتومنتين على أيدي ابتكارهم من
صنايدي الدولة الإسلامية وجهودها الذين باعوا الحياة لمحاربة فيهم وحلى ولائهم تفوقوا الأبديف من أخلاقهم الأسرى
وبعضها تلقى بيد الصريم والضيق نعم مينة السرية وسجى المكابحة وسجى السفراء بحلب ودائم مجيء ودائم...

أعراض عدوهم وتركوا درها على أصاب الحسن ودعاك على كراء الصفراء بقائد الفتح.

2. لم يكن من أشياء الشروط: تحمي جنود الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام من زرع الإسلام أخذنا على عصابتنا إرجاع
أعمال الخلافة الإسلامية وذفن الظلم والجحش عن أهلنا وإخواننا بعد النقبين الأفخ صناعة على قرب المسلمين والمعلم على
تبعها وفصولها.

3. جعل الأشياء بما حصر لنا منهم وكان سراهم إلى الله، والأصل في الدبي الإسلامي لا يأخذ أحداً بالقلم والبهجة بل بالإله.

النوايا والمحجة الساترة. والمقدم عدادنا إحساستنا للذين في المسلمين يكتن ذاك لعليته وعوو المهمين.

المشوي في ظلم حكناً أموت مطعوناً، فقوله لا زاح للعيش إلا في ظلم حكناً إسالمي ي الفلسطينية وجعل هدوهم وصف المفدى
من حسن حكنا، ومن كان عليتنا بالأمن نفخ فهوي زرعية آمن، إلا من صبح زرعية.

4. الأموال التي كانت تحت فتحت الحكومة الصغرى (من العام) أمرها عائدة إلى إمام المسلمين وهو الذي تولى مصرفتها في
مصايف المسلمين وليست أخذ أن يبتين بها هذه韓ه أو سلسة أو نحو ذلك ولا مغرفة الدخل لإمام الشعب في
والعيسوية في الأزق الفرصة الرادعة بها، وكذلك الملك الخاص من المال والوقت ونفاذ من شروط من تقبال من خير لا ضفة له فيه
كان عليه التقفع، وتعمل على عصابات السفر السائل على النهج مفصل في الأرض ونذكر به قوله تعالى: (إِنَّا نَزَّلْنَا السَّمَاعَاءَ
لكم، وممّا ترى وعملت في الأرض فنقدًا أن تقتلون، أو تصنعوا، أو تقطعوا أثريكم، وأصلحتكم من عينك وقفاً)
فلا ترى حكناً بكتبة في الأرض وأمهم في الأرض وطعنة في الأرض.

5. المساجد في بلد الإخوان، أم السوفيات، أم العوام، أم البراءة، أم الزهايتي، والنجوم، والظم، وفيها تابعون فتحوا في
سماحة عناء إلى النواحي والتوحيد والưỡان، ومنه الورق، ومنه السفراء.

عمل يحدثه النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: (صلاة الجماعة للصلاة على ملة الرجل وحده خمساً وعشرين صلاة)
11. علمائنا ود Shame وحبطنا نازع الرؤوس وأدمن النفوذ، وهموا إلى وقتية يتيح للنازعة التاريخ ويبرق منها حيًا
الشعراء إلى وقتية صادقة لحزمة المدوان الراقصة المسوم، هم إلى اليوم، إسلامية تصطر، في هدوء الجهاد والإمداد
و لكن صفاً واحداً مرصوضاً كما أحبّ ريتاً وأمر فلؤس في ركض واحد رأله.
12. حذر حذراً من مراجعة المملكة ومغارة الحكومة فقد أن هذا الطريق والضباب ور숙 الكثر والضيوضة والجسر بالأيوم والأيام من السنة.
فلكي لا يذهب له، كما يحرج الاحتراق والتعلص بالحلم والمطر، ودخان الأسماء والضربات. 
13. وأنا مرتزقة من الشجاعة والخبرة وليمة الاجتهاد الهائلة فقولهم ثبت الراية، رفع الممتلكات، فما في بينها قد خضعها أبداً خاصته
لاستقبال التلميذين وترقباتهم وسلوبهم، أما من أمرها وفقي على رذيلة فليس لها إلا القليل، للنبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: (من ي♫
من بدل دينه فاقترب.)
14. وأنا الماجيك والنجومات والمرأة بتشبيه العبارة، دخل السلاح فلا تلبس الناقة، صلى الله عليه وسلم: (من أتاكم وأحكم
جميع على رجل واحد يريد أن يقص عصابكم أو يفرق جماعكم، فاقتربوا،) رواه مسلم، وفي رواية أخرى لمسلم: (فامس
السفي كان في كأناً.)
15. أمر الله تعالى بالجماعة والإصلاح وليد الفرقة والخلافة، وكثير الجماعة خير من صفر الفرقة، والانقسام من خلاف الشيطان
وشدد المسلمين ضعفي في الازحلاء تحت راية قوية العقلية صاحبة العرف، خير كبير فضل أن تعدد المشارب
والأحوال يضر من الفرقة والانقسام مما يحتل من العمل الجهادي يشكر وله الله تعالى
16. إذا مكرر الدول من الهيكلة للأولى الهيكلة في سبيل يستمدا سلطاً الشبكة وتحركها بالعمل والسياحة وضمها للأعمال التي القبلة
كاهل الناس من القوامين العقلية المفيدة، وحد يجعله في الإيجاب خير لأهل الأمة من أن يفتح أعين صحا.
17. وفقنا من المشاهد والمواقف الشرسة والمواقف الوهيب هو مصحح بسي صلي الله عليه وسلم: (أن لا ندافع إلا طمسه
ولا يفر مثلاً) الكفاح، حسم الإتجار والعطش بالشراب والمطر، والدفاع، وترك
الخروج إلا الحاجة هو هذى أمته المؤمنين والصحابة الجبلين من الله تعالى.
18. وأنا وانغما في حكم إسلامي، يقظ وراعى واستفاد من السلمة، بحيلة، والإصلاح والإعتراف.
19. في الحفظ تذكر عدالة الوقفة، فقولهم: أنا الناس، إنكم قد جرمت الأمة العلمانية، كنوا ورد على كفاح الحوفي البديع
فالمجاهدة، فالحبية، الفاسفة، وقد جرت على ذلك قوة وتقدمها وأمورها، وناهل الآن حلف الدولة الإسلام، وعهد
الإمام أبي بكر الصحي، وسروت بحول الله توقفهم على الفرق الواضح الشائع بين حكومة غمامة جاذبة صاحب توقف دينه
وهم كما قررتهم، ودبروا توقفهم وخرجوا كساء إزاء قتالات الوحي الدائر الهدى والقضاء به أبيض اللحى، واشتغيل
الصحبة من الفضيل والأمير والحر والعبيد، لافرق بين واحد واثين، ودفر الجهد حتى نفخنا قبل غيرنا كما قال رجاء عزوجل: (إذا
يا الله ماتنا تزويق أن جدتش شهداء إن الله وله على الفسفك، وأرائين، والأنقر، إن يكل في شيء أو في شيء، كافلة أولى
يهمها فلا نعيش،) الناس 62، والله من رواى القصد.

المكتب الإعلامي لولاية نينوى
**Appendix B**

Translation of “List of Ta’zir Penalties,” shown in Figure 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>Ta’zir Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening store/shop during prayers</td>
<td>• Locking the store/shop for 48 hours, notifying the accused, pledging to never repeat the violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locating a man outside the mosque during prayers</td>
<td>• Advising the man to attend the mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• If he refuses, he shall be notified and summoned to the Hisba Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not confining to women’s Islamic dress code</td>
<td>• Taken into custody in Hisba center, male custodian forced to buy her “abaya”, custodian flogged 20 times in front of her</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men who wear:</td>
<td>• To be held custody in Hisba center for a day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clothes which resemble those worn by infidels or women</td>
<td>• Shave his head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tight clothes</td>
<td>• Change his clothes in the presence of his custodian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shaved beards</td>
<td>• Flogging 15-30 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accessories such as bracelets and chains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassing women</td>
<td>• To be held in custody for 3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Flogging 30-50 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singing</td>
<td>• Confiscating the device used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Signing a pledge to not repeat the action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catching a non-married couple (male and female) alone in a vehicle or closed room</td>
<td>• Flogging of male 15–30 times, summoning the custodian of the female, both to sign pledges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plucking eyebrows (male)</td>
<td>• Flogging (20 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Advising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Signing a pledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying a device with images that violate Shari’ah</td>
<td>• Foreign images: flogging (20-30) times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deleting images</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 An abaya is a long and loose black garment that covers the entire female body.