A year after the death of Osama Bin Laden, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has continued on its upward trajectory clearly assuming the role as al Qaeda’s dominant and most dangerous affiliate. At a time when the al Qaeda organization globally has met a low point al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has reached its zenith despite successful U.S. airstrikes on the American al Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and senior AQAP figure Fahd al-Quso - indicted in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen.

Recent revelations of a third generation of Ibrahim al-Asiri’s stealthy underwear bomb (previously seen for example in the attempt to blow up Northwest flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009), quite likely undetectable by airport screening devices, clearly indicates that AQAP continues to pursue attacks on the West outside of Yemen. In contrast to other al Qaeda affiliates, AQAP and its emergent, parallel insurgent organization Ansar al-Sharia have militarily won and held large swathes of territory. AQAP/Ansar al-Sharia governs portions of Yemen providing social services to Yemeni people neglected by the Saleh regime. In turn, American airstrikes against AQAP targets have quickened in the past year. With the demise of Osama Bin Laden, military and intelligence resources have been reallocated to pursue AQAP members in a fashion similar to those successful techniques utilized in the Afghanistan and Pakistan regions. Mixed with U.S. counterterrorism successes have been some mistakes. In response, critics of drone warfare have grown in the past year questioning the targeting processes for drone
strikes, civilian casualties and more recently the use of a poorly understood targeting methodology known as “signature strikes.” These same critics as well as experts on counterterrorism and diplomacy rightly question the U.S. strategy to defeat AQAP noting that drones alone are unlikely to result in the terror group’s complete demise.

The persistence of the AQAP threat and the increased scrutiny of the U.S. drone program bring these authors to revisit the important role of drones and special operations forces in the fight against AQAP in Yemen. Specifically, the following questions arise: 1) If drones (airstrikes) have been successful in deterring AQAP, then why has the terror group persisted over the past year – even holding territory in Yemen? 2) Do drone strikes eliminate more of a terrorist threat than they create? 3) How should the U.S. appropriately move forward in its use of drone strikes and special operations forces in Yemen as well as in the future fight against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups?

Debates over these questions have been further fueled recently by key revelations. Unfortunate leaks within the U.S. government have shed light on the process by which the Obama administration, with guidance from the military and intelligence communities, develops target lists. A second round of leaks detailed how the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) coordinate and debate their application of drones against targets that pose a threat to the U.S. homeland. Ironically, the debate generated by these two revelatory articles has been briefly interrupted by news of a drone strike in Pakistan that killed al Qaeda’s most recent “Number 2” - Abu Yahya al-Libi. Thus, in the span of a week, the American public has grown quite uncomfortable about how terrorist targets are chosen while once again evidence of drone effectiveness has emerged.

**What have drones and Special Operations Forces (SOF) accomplished over the past year?**

In the past year, drone strikes and Special Operations Forces (SOF) eliminated key AQAP members at a time when the U.S. lacked any viable counterterrorism partner in Yemen. Drones (airstrikes) have eliminated several key AQAP leaders over the past year. On September 30, 2011, U.S. counterterrorism forces killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an important member of AQAP’s external operations branch and a key online radicalizer facilitating the recruitment of Western al Qaeda fighters. Eliminating Awlaki robbed al Qaeda of one of its few notable theologians with the cultural and linguistic fluency to resonate powerfully with Westerners. Additionally, Awlaki had the potential to
invigorate al Qaeda’s brand during a particularly dark period for our adversaries after Bin Laden’s death. With Awlaki came the demise of Samir Khan, AQAP’s American propagandist and editor of the online al Qaeda English language magazine *Inspire*. While *Inspire*’s effectiveness as an online radicalizing agent is debatable, the magazine’s frequency and quality have been notably diminished since Khan’s death, and the magazine appears to be less effective in rallying future rounds of AQAP foreign fighter recruits.

More recently, two current members of AQAP involved in al Qaeda’s bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, Abdul Mun’im Salim al Fatahani (January 31, 2012) and Fahd al-Quso (May 6, 2012), were also killed by airstrikes. In addition, several other airstrikes have eliminated key AQAP members with operational linkages to al Qaeda’s senior leaders and training camps. Overall, the past year has clearly demonstrated the capability of U.S. drones and Special Operations Forces to engage AQAP in locations that would otherwise be unreachable, or require a significant military presence.

**Why has AQAP continued to thrive over the past several years?**

AQAP’s persistence arises not only from internal instability in Yemen but even more from exogenous forces leading this al Qaeda affiliate to be bolstered above all others. Critics of drone strikes myopically focus on this tactic as the singular cause for AQAP’s ascension. Drone strikes at most provide only a peripheral and recent motivation for the growth of a terrorist affiliate that has been aggressively attempting to expand over the past five years.

Several phenomena occurring outside Yemen’s borders have been the primary catalyst for AQAP’s emergence. First, foreign fighter records captured by U.S. forces in Iraq in 2007 indicated that Yemeni foreign fighters were the second most likely to choose to be “fighters” rather than “martyrs” when they arrived in Iraq. This data point signaled the intent of some Yemeni al Qaeda members in Iraq to return home should they survive Iraqi battlefields. By 2008, the U.S. “Surge” strategy took effect and foreign fighter flows slowed and largely reversed from Iraq. In turn, terrorist attack data from 2008 showed Yemen as the second highest country for terrorist attacks outside of Iraq and Afghanistan suggesting seasoned Yemeni foreign fighters from Iraq may have returned to wage jihad in their homeland.

Second, in 2005-2006, Saudi Arabia initiated a major counterterrorism clampdown on AQAP operatives pushing many veteran, Saudi al Qaeda members into Yemen where
they helped form AQAP’s second incarnation in 2009.8 Young Saudi men have long filled the ranks of al Qaeda and its affiliates, and Saudi Arabia’s persistent tamping down of internal al Qaeda threats creates terrorist bleedover in nearby Yemen.

Third, prior to his death, Bin Laden began searching for a new safe haven for relocating his battered operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As noted by Gabriel Koehler-Derrick in recent analysis of the Abbottabad documents declassified in May 2012, Bin Laden envisioned Yemen, “either as a “safe haven” for jihadists or a “reserve” force for al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan or Iraq.” Of all al Qaeda affiliates, Yemen provided the best venue for those al Qaeda operatives (particularly those from the Arabian Peninsula) seeking shelter from U.S. counterterrorism efforts.9

Fourth, Yemen provides Bin Laden and al Qaeda a safe haven more proximate to their essential base of financial support – wealthy Persian Gulf donors. Being bled by middlemen and the endless amount of protection money needed to sustain safe harbor in Pakistan, Bin Laden likely saw Yemen as a more efficient and effective location for securing resources. With his death, financial support for al Qaeda in Pakistan has decreased substantially and many believe that the remaining stream of al Qaeda donor support now flows to AQAP in Yemen, not al Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan.10 Even a slight increase in donor support in the wake of Bin Laden’s death would further empower AQAP.

Finally, foreign fighters that once would have flocked to Iraq (2005-2007) or Afghanistan (2008-2010) now likely see more opportunity for jihad by migrating to Yemen. While the foreign fighter flow to Yemen represents merely a trickle of what al Qaeda’s recruitment was at its height, AQAP in Yemen likely provides the most appealing option for joining an official affiliate of the al Qaeda movement – especially for those potential recruits in the Arabian Peninsula. Keep in mind that military actions, including the use of drones, have made travel to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) less appealing and less hospitable to foreign fighters. These successful U.S. military activities have had significant operational effects on al Qaeda and its affiliates by disrupting pipelines, and they serve as a strong deterrent to future al Qaeda activities in the FATA.11

In parallel to the many exogenous factors strengthening AQAP over the past five years, Yemen’s instability and intermittent military commitment to fighting AQAP has provided ample opportunity for the terror groups to expand over the past year. The political struggles of the Saleh regime and its replacement have undermined the
country’s military capacity allowing for AQAP and its insurgent arm Ansar al-Sharia to successfully advance and hold territory. The Yemeni government’s continuing inability to provide for portions of the Yemeni population allows AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia space to fill a void in needed social services and secure local popular support. Most importantly, Yemeni incompetence breathed life into a dormant AQAP franchise allowing known al Qaeda operatives on at least two occasions to escape detention providing much of the group’s current energy. While some narrowly point to drones for manufacturing AQAP, many exogenous and endogenous factors propel the group’s current external terrorism campaign and internal insurgency against the Yemeni state.

What do critics of drones misunderstand about drone operations in Yemen?

Critics of the U.S. drone campaign in Yemen confusingly lump together disparate issues related to terminology, intelligence processes, legal authorities and terrorist propaganda to justify stopping the use of the U.S.’s most effective counterterrorism technique – all while failing to offer a viable alternative for countering AQAP’s immediate threat to the U.S. Although an imperfect tool, drone strikes suppress terrorists in otherwise denied safe havens and limit jihadists’ ability to organize, plan and carry out attacks. These strikes help shield us from harm and serve our national interests. Doing nothing is simply not an option.

Media accounts of attacks in Yemen often mistakenly credit U.S. drones for every explosion in Yemen. Drones represent one of several technology platforms executing airstrikes that include cruise missiles, potentially U.S. or Yemeni fighter aircraft or even helicopter assaults. Drone critics correctly cite instances where poor intelligence leads to the killing of civilians and/or those in opposition to the Saleh regime. However, one of the instances commonly used in calls to end drone use in Yemen is actually not the result of a drone strike. Critics point to the intelligence failures of a cruise missile attack in al Majalah on December 17, 2009. As an example, Gregory Johnsen at Princeton University and Yemen expert writing at Waq-al-Waq led his rebuttal of current drone policy, entitled “Drones, Drift and the (New) American Way of War,” with criticisms of drone warfare by citing this December 17, 2009 cruise missile attack.

Instead of pointing to this incident as justification for halting drone strikes in Yemen, the civilian casualties created by this intelligence failure and use of a cruise missile alternatively suggest the need for the use of drones as a more surgical platform for achieving our counterterrorism objectives while minimizing civilian casualties. Cruise
missiles introduce several factors that may contribute to errant targeting. The limitations of cruise missiles, in many ways, provided the impetus for developing the drone platform. Cruise missiles 1) require intelligence far in advance of hitting their target, 2) take a considerable amount of time to travel to their target, 3) are difficult to divert from their target once launched and 4) employ large scale and more devastating munitions such as cluster bombs which can lead to increased civilian casualties. In contrast, drones can provide their own targeting intelligence devoid of Yemeni government influence, provide real-time visual surveillance of a target, minimize the time between target engagement and target impact, and use smaller munitions able to reduce civilian casualties. While neither technology platform is a perfect engagement tool, drones vis-à-vis cruise missiles have further improved the U.S. ability to engage terrorists and minimize civilian casualties.

Drone critics this past year have also challenged the legality of targeting AQAP members, specifically those members that are American citizens. First, drone and legal critics have challenged the legality of the drone strike killing American AQAP cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. In response, the U.S. Department of Justice released a memo in February 2012 detailing its justifications for targeting al-Awlaki in response to his planning and directing the attempted Christmas Day 2009 attempt on an airliner over Detroit. Even when given this evidence, these same critics continue to advocate that Awlaki should have been pursued through the U.S. legal system, charged with a federal crime, arrested and then tried in a courtroom. In addition to the obvious limitations the U.S. encounters trying to capture a terrorist residing in a volatile foreign safe haven, these arguments ignore the fact that Awlaki knowingly traveled outside the U.S. and admittedly joined an officially designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This action alone permits Awlaki’s targeting and undercuts the claims of illegality by drone critics. These authors believe the legal argument posed by drone critics in the case of Awlaki lacks legitimacy. It is worth emphasizing furthermore that drone strikes may not always be the preferred course. Attempts to capture high value targets are riskier but that downside may be outweighed by the potential intelligence value of key individuals. A case-by-case assessment will always be needed.

The second contentious legal debate related to drone targeting comes from the inadvertent killing of Anwar al-Awlaki’s son Abdulrahman al-Awlaki on October 14, 2012. Reporting suggests the intended target of the strike was AQAP’s media chief, Ibrahim al Bana. The death of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki is a tragedy and has become a rallying point for those believing U.S. drone strikes create excessive civilian casualties. However, these same critics cannot explain why Abdulrahman al-Awlaki
was present in the home of a suspected AQAP target, nor do they place any responsibility on Anwar al-Awlaki’s family who knowingly placed Abdulrahman in the orbit of terrorists clearly being pursued by the U.S.

Third and most recently, anti-drone advocates have rallied against the Obama administration’s recent authorization to implement signature strikes against AQAP in Yemen.19 This argument against drones, above all others, may prove the most credible. The term “signature strikes” suggests the notion that the U.S. fires missiles at unknown targets for simply looking suspicious. Journalists and human rights advocates are right to draw attention to the use of this tactic as it implies the killing of unknown people for unclear reasons. The signature strike tactic, if used injudiciously, will result in the killing of innocent civilians and is certainly more inclined to radicalize local populations and inspire further AQAP recruitment.

Those opposing drone use in Yemen commonly cite civilian casualties as reason for stopping drone strikes. Civilian casualties should be avoided at all costs, however drones in comparison to all other kinetic counterterrorism options, likely produce the fewest civilian casualties per engagement. Statistics and ratios remain difficult to calculate, and research has only just begun on this new counterterrorism application. But, in comparison to other forms of warfare, drone strikes may be one of the least civilian casualty producing tools in the history of warfare (See endnote).20 Large scale military intervention (i.e. regime change), broad-based counterinsurgency, backing of the Yemeni military, arming of militias – all of these counterterrorism options are far more likely to produce civilian casualties. Drones supported by intelligence provide U.S. counterterrorism efforts the most surgical and the least casualty-producing tool for engaging AQAP.

In conjunction with the debate over drones creating civilian casualties, media debates ignore how al Qaeda deliberately uses civilians as human shields against attack. In documents seized during the Abbottabad raid, Bin Laden instructs his operatives to avoid drone strikes by staying out of cars noting, “We could leave the cars because they are targeting cars now, but if we leave them, they will start focusing on houses and that would increase casualties among women and children.”21 Bin Laden instructed his operatives to use women and children as human shields against drones knowing 1) the U.S. would be more reluctant to target operatives when civilian casualties would be numerous and 2) the U.S. unknowingly killing civilians during drone attacks would undermine local popular support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts providing al Qaeda ample fuel for propaganda – a lesson learned by al Qaeda in past failed jihadi campaigns.
where their expansive violence against innocent civilians eroded local popular support for the terror group. The U.S. should continue to avoid civilian casualties from drone strikes, but drone critics must also realize how al Qaeda uses civilians as pawns for undermining drone strikes.

Some thoughtful critics of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen with whom we respectfully disagree, notably Gregory Johnsen of Princeton University22 and Jeremy Scahill of *The Nation* (although there are others)23, cite drone strikes as increasing the number of AQAP operatives in Yemen. The logic behind this assertion appears horribly backwards. The U.S. deploys drones where terrorist go – weak and failed states providing adequate safe haven for planning and executing terrorists attacks. However, the U.S. does not deploy drones to countries for the purpose of shooting at innocent people in hopes of creating terrorists.

Johnsen24, Scahill, the recent *Washington Post* article by Sudarsan Raghavan, “*In Yemen, U.S. airstrikes breed anger, and sympathy for al-Qaeda,*”25 and others (see endnote for summary)26 point to AQAP propaganda citing drones as motivation for terrorist recruitment and in turn suggest this as justification for the U.S. ceasing the tactic – essentially determining that if our terrorist enemies don’t like a tactic we should stop pursuing it. If one wants to assess which counterterrorism techniques are most effective against al Qaeda and affiliated groups, then look no further than al Qaeda’s propaganda. Al Qaeda, the Taliban and now AQAP have all focused their propaganda campaigns on eliminating the U.S. ability to employ night raids and drones. Why do they focus on these two tactics? Because night raids and drones are the most effective means for deterring these groups; Bin Laden admits this in his own internal documents captured in Abbottabad. Unable to leverage effective counter drone operations, al Qaeda, the Taliban and now AQAP seek to use propaganda to enrage local populations in hopes of interrupting this highly effective counterterrorism tool. Letting our adversaries (AQAP) dictate our tactics should never be an option.

**Should the U.S. continue to use drone strikes in Yemen?**

Overall, AQAP remains the most adaptive and lethal terrorist threat to the U.S. Despite the past year’s drone and SOF achievements, al-Asiri, AQAP’s innovative bomb-maker remains alive and continues to plot increasingly sophisticated attacks against Western airliners. Likewise, AQAP still holds territory in Yemen providing safe haven for plotting terrorist operations. The U.S. can make strategy and policy changes to address
AQAP’s threat and ensure the proper application of drones as a counterterrorism tool in Yemen that minimizes civilian casualties and potential blowback.

1- Continue improving on-the-ground intelligence in Yemen.

Drones and SOF provide critical counterterrorism tools for denying AQAP safe haven in Yemen and these elements will be a key component of U.S. counterterrorism efforts for many years to come. Yet as former CIA officer and former State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Hank Crumpton, pointed out when featured in a recent HSPI roundtable, drones are important but cannot be a substitute for human intelligence.27

As seen by recent revelations of an intelligence asset penetrating AQAP’s external operations branch and securing al-Asiri’s latest bomb device, intelligence remains the greatest need in Yemen. Likewise, improved intelligence will continue to improve the accuracy of drone strikes while minimizing the collateral damage to civilians.

2- Introduce greater transparency and accountability in drone operations

To avoid further popular backlash against the use of drone strikes and retain the use of this critical counterterrorism tool, the current administration should consider taking several steps to create needed controls and transparency regarding the application of drone strikes. Here are some recommended issues that should be resolved:

- Clearly define what is meant by the term “Signature Strikes”: The U.S. should not be engaging targets if we are unsure what the target is. The rules of ground warfare should be applied equally to drone campaigns. A target must be appropriately identified before it is engaged. Engaging unknown targets based strictly on a subjective measure of “suspicious behavior” will lead to unnecessary killing and bolster local popular support for AQAP. This is not to say that signature strikes should be off limits. To the contrary, we argue simply that the parameters for such strikes must be clear so as to avoid the human toll and resulting blowback generated by the expansive use of what is intended to be a surgical tool.
- **Establish standard justifications across the military and intelligence communities for authorizing drone targeting.** Some have cast doubts on the justifications for the selection and targeting of AQAP operatives. Recent articles in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* (“Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will”; and “U.S. Drone targets in Yemen raise questions”) suggest two organizations, the CIA and JSOC, separately conduct drone operations in Yemen. While these agencies are expected to coordinate their operations, the parallel use of drones by two organizations call into question whether there are different standards for being targeted by drone strikes. Consolidating drone operations and targeting lists under a central command and control architecture for each theater would ensure appropriate selection, prioritization and engagement of targets. This is but one example of the larger need to ensure that authorities under Titles 10 and 50 are synchronized.

- **Consider the creation of a targeting review panel for who is placed on the strike list, as a long term solution for establishing necessary controls and transparency in the drone targeting and application process.** The 9/11 al Qaeda attacks ushered in a new era of threats and warfare. Drone warfare will be a critical tool for the U.S. to engage non-state adversaries for the foreseeable future. While the protection of sources and methods of intelligence gathered in support of drone operations is both necessary and understandable, the U.S. ought to establish a review process for assessing the legality and culpability of an individual being targeted by drones. The U.S. might examine the establishment of a secret panel of judges and policymakers that hear cases for placing individuals on a targeting list. A single individual, as suggested in recent articles – even the Commander-in-Chief, should not be the lone arbitrator for each person proposed for targeting. An established process involving a collective judgment will render more defensible and consistent rulings. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court might provide an example structure for how secret information can be protected while evaluating the evidence for placing a terrorist on a targeting list.
Anticipate challenges to justifications for targeting – especially in the case of U.S. citizens that join foreign terrorist organizations. In the future, the U.S. government should anticipate challenges to its justifications for targeting individuals – particularly U.S. citizens who have joined FTO’s. The Department of Justice was correct to have released the memo justifying the targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki. The DOJ memo did provide needed justifications, but the delay in its release (an unnecessary delay as there seems to have been no apparent risk in divulging the information) only led to a general sense of conspiracy that undermined the justification for and application of future drone strikes against critical terrorist targets. A solution to this challenge that strikes a balance between the government’s need for secrecy and the public’s right to transparency might include the rapid public disclosure of all information justifying targeting that does not compromise intelligence sources and methods.

3- Develop a long-term strategy for defeating AQAP in Yemen.

A year ago, we advocated the use of drones and SOF as a short-term strategy to mitigate the immediate threat presented by AQAP to the U.S. As we noted in that report, drones alone cannot entirely defeat AQAP and a larger, long-run strategy is needed for pursuing U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Yemen. While this paper cannot adequately detail this solution, we still call on experts on Yemeni affairs and critics of drones to answer, “if it is not drones and SOF alone for defeating AQAP, what does the solution incorporate?” Again we reiterate, doing nothing is simply not an option.

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Founded in 2003, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) is a nonpartisan “think and do” tank whose mission is to build bridges between theory and practice to advance homeland security through an interdisciplinary approach. By convening domestic and international policymakers and practitioners at all levels of government, the private and non-profit sectors, and
academia, HSPI creates innovative strategies and solutions to current and future threats to the nation. The opinions expressed in this Issue Brief are those of the authors alone. Comments should be directed to hspi@gwu.edu

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15 For those interested in the evolution of drones as a counterterrorism alternative, the recent 60 Minutes interview “Hank Crumpton: My life as a spy” provides relevant discussion related to the limitations of cruise missiles for engaging Osama Bin Laden during the 1990’s and how these limitations led the U.S. to develop other tools, notably drones, to engage terrorists. See the interview available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57433105/hank-crumpton-life-as-a-spy/


