

November 2015

Paris Insights

Center for Cyber
& Homeland Security

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY



PARIS INSIGHTS

PARIS INSIGHTS contains the reflections of key decision-makers and subject matter experts on three dimensions of the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015:

- **The implications of the Paris attacks**
- **What they mean for the U.S. homeland in particular, and**
- **Thoughts on the way forward**

Respondents were asked to provide brief responses to one or more of the above questions. Their replies have not been edited. As a compilation, this publication incorporates thoughts from Members of the Center's Board of Directors and many of our Senior Fellows, whose collective experience provides a variety of perspectives on the challenges that lie ahead for the United States, its allies and partners.

Max Abrahms

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northeastern University

Over the past decade, the conventional wisdom has been turned on its head. At the time, I was doing field research in the West Bank on Palestinian terrorism. One day from the back of a cab, I started reading a study called the "Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," where the author Robert Pape claimed that groups use terrorism because it is so effective at pressuring governments into appeasing the perpetrators. As evidence, he pointed to the Palestinians as the paradigmatic case that terrorism pays. I was immediately struck by the disconnect between what I was reading and seeing. The Palestinians I spoke with did not regard themselves as a political success story. Quite the opposite, their terrorism shifted the Israeli electorate to the right, eroded national support for the peace process, created the security fence which is deeply unpopular among Palestinians, and crushed their dream of an independent state. I began to wonder, if the Palestinians are the success story, then how have other groups fared politically that used terrorism.

Over the past decade, I began publishing the first empirical studies ever

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done on how countries react to terrorism. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I find that groups almost never pressure governments into making concessions by attacking their civilians. In fact, the exact opposite tends to happen. When their civilians are targeted, governments become significantly less likely to comply politically. Instead, governments become more hawkish to the terrorists and their sympathizers, very often with military force.

This is exactly what is happening in response to the Islamic State attacks. As my research predicts, France and Russia are presently taking turns bombing the lights out of Islamic State in Raqqa. At home, they are also tightening their counterterrorism measures. These reactions may not defeat Islamic State, but will ensure that the attrition rate exceeds the recruitment rate, ultimately weakening the group.

Terrorists should be careful what they wish for. The French and Russian responses are good examples of what I call the terrorism boomerang effect.

Jason T. Barnosky

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Director of Government Relations, National Emergency Management Association

The big buzzword in homeland security circles over the past few years has been “resilience”—the idea that we need to strengthen our ability to absorb and bounce back from attacks and other threats. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has made building national resilience a priority, highlighting it in strategic documents and encouraging it through federal assistance. We’ve seen the value of resiliency in practice in our states and cities—most famously in Boston, where the “Boston Strong” ethos contributed to record attendance at the Boston Marathon one year after the 2013 bombing.

If the events in Paris are an indication of what is to come—attacks on soft targets such as restaurants and music and sporting venues—then it suggests our turn toward resilience has been a smart one, and it points in a direction for others to consider. It will never be possible to protect every coffee shop or theater that could represent a target, and we can’t expect intelligence and law enforcement agencies to collect and understand all the information that we would need to do so. But we can deny terrorists the fear and hysteria they hope to create by minimizing the disruption and returning to normal as quickly as possible.

That’s why it’s crucial for communities—nations, cities, towns—to do what they can to prepare for threats such as these. This means investing in more than just technology and stepped up security.

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It means planning, collaborating, and encouraging self-reliant citizens who can handle the unexpected. By responding and recovering quickly, we allow people to get on with their lives and move past the terror. The aftermath of the Paris attacks suggests we'll see just this sort of resilience among the French. As one man told *The New York Times* as he drank a beer at a bistro, "With this simple act, we're showing that we are never going to let the terrorists get at the heart of France."

Nicholas V. Cagliuso

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Assistant Vice President, Emergency Management at NYC Health + Hospitals

The Paris attacks, Superstorm Sandy, and the 2003 Northeast blackout are but a few stark examples of threats that emergency managers, and the people we protect, face. From an all-hazards perspective, the common thread tying these (and all other) events together is that successful outcomes depend on clear and consistent communication, coordination and collaboration across key stakeholders.

What's more, these "3 c's" must occur during all incident phases, including mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, to accomplish one thing: the marriage of scarce resources. So, while many similarities exist between intentional, natural and technological incidents, the Paris attacks, and all intentional events, present distinct challenges, especially to the health care delivery system infrastructure, and its key role in a locale's overall resiliency.

Emergency management scholars and practitioners alike concur that when entities communicate, coordinate and collaborate, the outcomes, in terms of morbidity and mortality - amongst many other metrics - are favorable. When we don't employ the "3 c's," outcomes suffer.

The Paris attacks are an indication of what is possible. Regardless of a terror attack's scope, intensity or duration, fatalities and physical injuries, coupled with the untoward impacts to behavioral health of the targets, are of critical importance to the perpetrators. Distilled, such incidents demand that health care emergency management allocate the increasingly scarce clinical, operational and financial resources of the health care delivery system to treat patients, while simultaneously acknowledging that health care facilities themselves are soft targets.

Multi-modal, layered attacks, such as those carried out in Paris, are part of the standard tactics of terrorists. While the best response strategy is to mitigate the threat altogether, key actors must craft modular and scalable approaches for rapid response implementation. The health care delivery system, from small, rural-based facilities, to large, urban academic medical centers, must continue to

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communicate, coordinate and collaborate, internally and externally with myriad stakeholders at the local, state, federal and international levels. Central to the ability to lead such work is the funding necessary to support these cornerstones of our communities so that they can continue to ensure safe, efficient and effective care for all.

David Carabin

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Director, Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) and Boston Police Department's Bureau of Intelligence & Analysis

The below commentary represents the opinions of the author and not that of the Boston Police Department.

The November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris highlight the devastation that can be caused within a metropolitan city, by motivated individuals using low tech, low cost means, and by striking soft targets with little-to-no warning. The terrorist threat environment has evolved to a point where low sophistication is recognized as a means to avoid detection, dynamically select targets, strike at will, and instill “terror” regardless of the number of casualties or economic impact. The act alone, regardless of measure of success, is enough to generate a fearful response from the civilian population, challenge the confidence in our security capabilities, and market the cause of the terrorist.

A challenge we have recognized over the last 12-18 months is that individuals that were on the radar of law enforcement and intelligence have been able to act out violently without early interception of warnings, and certainly without the ability for intervention. A common theme indicates that in some locations there are not enough resources to support 24/7 surveillance of those suspected of mobilizing to violence. In other instances, not enough information could be gleaned in time to justify the application of enhanced surveillance techniques. In many cases, the timeframe from radicalization to mobilization has shrunk from months to years, to days to weeks.

Another challenge is related to technology and common communication mechanisms. Commercially available applications that employ the latest encryption technologies are inhibiting intelligence and law enforcement from using lawful means to intercept and exploit communications that will likely be key to stopping future attacks. Additionally, the extensive use of social media for the proliferation of propaganda and recruitment presents a “big-data” problem that challenges our effectiveness in sifting through the noise for early indicators of radicalization and/or mobilization.

Could similar devastation occur within the U.S.? Yes. Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE's) present one of the greatest threats to our Homeland Security, and we have experience with small groups of HVE's forming covert cells. We have seen evidence of ISIL's success in marketing their

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propaganda and recruitment mechanisms to U.S. citizens, and we are aware that there are hundreds of cases focused on HVE's nationally, with investigations in all 50 states. On any given Friday night, in most major U.S. cities, thousands of people gather within densely populated neighborhoods, at restaurants, entertainment venues and large sporting events. The similarities to the conditions in Paris are telling. While not all of the factors align, there are enough present for analysts to hypothesize that similar attacks could happen here, with similar consequences, as we are faced with many of the same challenges that surprised and overwhelmed our foreign counterparts.

However, the Paris attacks should not be considered a wake up call, as many pundits have speculated, but rather a reminder that the tactics employed in today's threat environment will have devastating effects within our communities if we fail to take appropriate precautionary measures. Continued investment in intelligence sharing and analytical collaboration among local, state and federal law enforcement organizations, the Intelligence Community, the private sector, and our communities, will be key to prevention. Frequently exercising and enhancing our tactical capabilities, and thereby enhancing our effectiveness in responding to incidents, neutralizing threats, and dynamically performing forensic examination of evidence, will prove critical to saving lives and mitigating the effect of incidents that occur within the homeland.

Michael Chertoff

CCHS Board Director;

Co-Founder and Executive Chairman, The Chertoff Group;

Former Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

The Paris attack demonstrated that Daesh and its affiliates now have a broader operational network in Europe than we have seen in recent years. At the same time, resource constraints and barriers to information exchange hampered the ability of the authorities to monitor suspects when they were in the planning stages. This should be a wake-up call about the need for Europeans to better integrate and modernize their intelligence and security capabilities, especially in light of the huge influx of people coming into the continent from Syria and the region.

At the same time here at home we should review our current security posture and make sure we are addressing gaps. But we should avoid a hysterical reaction that closes our doors to Europeans or imposes draconian new screening measures. We have been doing counter-terrorism well for over a decade, and while the Paris attack was an atrocity, it is the kind of threat we have been preparing for years to disrupt or respond to in our own country.

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Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash

CCHS Director and Associate Director

The Paris attacks are striking for their hybrid nature. They combined foreign direction with local execution and, from the vantage point of the perpetrators they did so successfully and in a sophisticated way — all while maintaining secrecy, which is no easy feat. As the Continent remains on high alert, France and its European Union partners contemplate how best to respond, together with the United States.

While the scale and scope of the current threat environment is considerably higher in Europe due to the large number of foreign fighters in the region, America is not immune. ISIS has certainly demonstrated ample intent to strike at and in the United States; and too many examples of foreign-inspired homegrown plots directed against the U.S. homeland have already come to light.

Next steps demand a shift in strategy. Containment is not working and more of the same simply will not do. Unlike Al Qaeda and its affiliates, which were parasitic in nature and fed off of ungoverned and under-governed spaces, ISIS is a para-state. Accordingly, a military response that keeps ISIS looking over its shoulder is necessary. A surge of Special Forces together with significant air power may be the preferred way forward. Like the adversary which combines centralized decision-making with decentralized execution, the response of the United States, its allies, and partners must be unified and networked. And that response, marked by U.S. leadership, must take the battlefield wherever it exists, including in the cyber domain.

Yet, military measures alone will not suffice. The adversary's challenge is multidimensional and so too must be our response. A powerful response to the adversary's narrative and ideology, which has consistently served to expand and replenish our opponents' ranks, remains the most important weapon still missing from the U.S. counterterrorism arsenal. A robust counter-narrative can take us only so far on its own; but without it, ISIS will retain the capacity to regenerate and re-root itself around the world.

While ISIS may have stolen the spotlight from Al Qaeda of late, it is important to remember that competition between the two is, from a U.S. standpoint, complicated by a measure of convergence. The jihadist orbit is not characterized by watertight compartments, but rather by porous borders across which operatives, techniques, and tactics travel regularly and without sufficient impediment. This aspect of the challenge and the others detailed above require a near-universal marshaling of resources and ingenuity. Because, from Beirut to Bamako, nous sommes tous Paris.

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Matthew Doherty

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Senior Vice President, Federal Practice, Hillard Heintze

As I conduct threat assessment investigations regarding public and corporate figures, we try and determine if a person has the interest, motive, or means to mount an attack; and we are sometimes made aware of information that suggests an inappropriate or unusual interest in our client such as going to their home, office or hotel. Evidence of pre-attack surveillance is oftentimes derived from well-trained residential, office or hotel staff reporting suspicious activity. Unfortunately, poorly trained staff not trained on how to observe or report suspicious and potentially pre-attack behaviors can have tragic and monetary consequences.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris last week, corporate security departments supporting business personnel, assets and operations in the United States should take moderately enhanced security steps over the near term – assuming no further major international or national terrorist events occur. These enhanced activities should focus on areas such as: (a) enhanced security awareness among all employees; (b) CCTV monitoring for pre-attack surveillance; (c) elevated and counter-measures at key facilities and high-risk locations; and (d) revision of travel security plans. Long-Term Priorities: Given the recent terrorist attacks – such as the likely bombing of the Russian A321 jet over Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula on October 31 and the Paris attacks just over a week ago – U.S. corporate security departments need to increase their focus on security planning and execution.

These priorities should include areas such as: (a) security awareness training for employees; (b) active shooter planning and preparedness; (c) Security Operations Center capabilities and crisis communications; and (d) participation in multi-jurisdictional exercises with federal, state and local third-party responders.

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Alberto Fernandez

CCHS Board Director;

Former U.S. Ambassador; Vice President, MEMRI

Despite the fact that the Islamic State has been around since 2006, the November 2015 Paris attacks have unleashed a high-profile wave of soul-searching, fear, recriminations and anger somewhat similar to but even more intense than the fallout which greeted ISIS's spectacular coming out in 2014. That double blow of the fall of Mosul and the declaration of the Baghdadi Caliphate caught the world's attention and captivated a new wave of Salafi Jihadists, an inspired and eager revolutionary minority.

Paris is both graphic evidence of the tremendous success of the Islamic State and of its fragility. An organization that lost Sinjar last week and has an increasingly long list of battlefield failures over the past year – Mosul Dam, Amerli, Tikrit, Baiji, Kobane, Tell Abyad, Al-Hasakeh, Kweiris – boasts of conquering Rome and setting European cities aflame.

But if ISIS the physical state is under increasing pressure, and could see more battlefield losses in the coming months, ISIS the state of mind still seems to be flourishing. The prominence of some of its deadly regional branches – especially in Sinai, Libya and Nigeria – keeps the image of constant success and expansion viable. While the scope and reach of ISIS propaganda seems to have peaked in late 2014, it has cemented itself as a powerful brand, a “condensed symbol” for a venomous laundry list of poses, grievances, and actions drawing strength and meaning from the wider spectrum of Salafi Jihadist action.

The most immediate result of Paris and its most significant implication for the American homeland is that such a successful attack raises the ante for Al-Qa'ida and for ISIS itself to top the latest outrage. The success of ISIS in the jihadosphere has ignited a propaganda, military, and operational arms race with the livelier portions of the Al-Qa'ida enterprise, particularly Nusrah Front and AQAP in Yemen.

A way forward must include the urgent physical annihilation of the ISIS “state” in Syria and Iraq, an act which will damage the ISIS “brand” and its marketing, but we should also realize that Al-Qa'ida is playing perhaps a shrewder, humbler, more long term game than ISIS and that the Sunni Arab Muslim world continues to be fraught with the failed states of tomorrow, which – like the Syria and Iraq of today – will provide fertile ground for the next onslaught of radical Islamist action and terrorism, in the region and beyond.

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William F. Flynn

CCHS Senior Fellow;

President, GARDA Risk Management, LLC

Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, and certainly following the coordinated shooting and bombing attacks in Mumbai, India, in November 2008, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have worked closely with local law enforcement and the owners and operators of shopping malls, stadiums, arenas, and other large venues frequented by the public to enhance their security given the intent and capability of violent extremists to strike locations where ordinary people engage in commerce, transportation, and entertainment.

Much progress has been made in the past 14 years and many of the challenges exposed by 9/11—particularly the lack of coordination among all levels of government and the private sector—have been or are being overcome. Notwithstanding these successes, the tactics used in the attacks in Paris last week, require a recommitment in the homeland to heightening our vigilance of potential attacks. This must be done without curtailing our civil liberties and keeping us from enjoying places of public gathering.

With this recommitment to vigilance in mind, what are the tactics, techniques and procedures used in the Paris attacks from which we can draw applicable lessons in the U.S. going forward?

The self-proclaimed Islamic State, using savvy social-media techniques and encrypted communication, has traditionally targeted the West by inspiring homegrown extremists to conduct relatively low-tech assaults against law enforcement and the military. The tragedy in Paris, which apparently involved extremists who traveled to Syria for pernicious reasons, is essentially a game-changer from this approach.

Notably, the attacks present new challenges for private security and first responders. Specifically, Paris highlights a much more complex and coordinated assault involving heavily-armed teams with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Also of concern in these attacks is the terrorists' use of suicide vests—at the soccer stadium, theater and during the subsequent police raid in the Saint Denis section of Paris—and the explosives they contained.

The attackers used triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a homemade explosive made from readily available precursor materials, versus some form of military grade explosive, for their suicide vests. TATP has been used in several terrorist attacks around the world, but this type of explosive device would not lend itself to be constructed far in advance of its use due to the fact that it cannot be easily stored, and therefore, it would have to be constructed close to the timeline for the attack. TATP is difficult to work with, and the large quantity and the fact that the devices functioned as designed, indicates a

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professional bomb-maker or someone that was well trained to construct these devices. Accordingly, the ability to deftly work with and deploy these explosives presents a challenge that U.S. governmental organizations and private sector partners—particularly those owning and operating mass gathering venues—must work together to address.

It is also important to note that Paris highlighted the stark differences between security at sports stadiums and music venues. A pair of suicide bombers that targeted the 80,000 fans at the Stade de France during a soccer match were prevented from entering the stadium by security and were ultimately only able to kill one person in addition to themselves. By sharp contrast, the attackers who struck Le Bataclan, where 1,500 people were gathered for a concert, were able to get inside the venue with firearms and IEDs and ultimately kill 89 people and seriously wound hundreds. While there is no perfect security plan and we must not allow fear to deter us from enjoying our public spaces, Paris demonstrated that properly trained and threat-focused security can mitigate the consequences of an attack.

These evolving tactics; the growing number of homegrown violent extremists fueled by social media; and the unpredictable external plotting of the Islamic State, requires a re-examination of security and response protocols for a much broader range of commercial venues here in the United States

Gregory Gardner

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Chief Architect, Government and Defense Solutions, NetApp

In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, sorting through the blizzard of reporting and commentary to succinctly define a more productive way forward for the United States and its allies is challenging. What follows is an informed layman’s recommendation based on six observations.

1. Insightful commentators encourage Westerners to read the Islamist newspapers and consider their reactions to the attacks in Paris. In many, the West is cast as a land of “infidels,” and the attacks as retribution for the West’s onslaught against Islam. In these publications, Muslims and Arabs are the enemies of the secular and the Jews. The Palestinian question is invoked along with the “rape” of Iraq, the memory of colonial trauma, and so on. The West is NOT morally superior to the Islamic State, they argue, and they cite three important pre-requisites to re-stabilizing the region: End Western support to the extended Saudi royal family; end all Western intervention in the region; and establish a single Israeli/Palestinian state with equal rights for all its citizens. Views like this spread, morph, and fester on the Islamist street and in

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social media despite the fact that political leaders send their condolences to France and denounce this crime against humanity.

2. The resulting anger and frustration enables Islamic State (IS), as a revolutionary political movement, to continually gain members and affiliates among extremist groups around the world. They sign up for what IS offers as its objective: a global caliphate where day-to-day life is governed by extreme religious views.
3. IS relies heavily on foreigners because, according to terrorism researchers, they are highly ideological; they aren't rooted locally; and they are prepared to do anything.
4. IS may be an outgrowth of al-Qaeda but its strategic concept, its willingness to kill other Muslims, and its grisly tactics differ significantly. IS and its offshoots will continue to morph and will remain lethal until they are forcibly eradicated. Eliot Cohen argues this is a long duration World War that requires endurance; a frank, shared understanding of the IS ideology; and a commitment to the long, bloody, costly process it will take to win.
5. A short-duration major ground attack by Western-led forces -- a punitive raid -- to “destroy” IS will not succeed. It will give the terrorists easy targets; it will encourage more terrorist violence; it will take the pressure off local forces to perform; it will cause Western participants to take sides in civil conflicts; and it will eventually lead to some form of long-duration occupation force.
6. IS, confronted at every turn by a global coalition, is not having an easy time of it. Focused, daily airstrikes are beginning to seriously degrade its infrastructure, it is under increasingly effective ground attack by Peshmerga and other forces, and its social media venues are under attack by Anonymous and others.

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Conclusion: No easy answers – but clearly a solely military approach by the US and other Western allies will not succeed.

The way forward should include:

- a. Diplomatically: Initiate an international “Marshall Plan”-like project to invest in Islamic countries. Augment this with a thoughtful information campaign that directly and indirectly counters both the IS ideology and the perception of the West as enemies of Islam. Highlight in social and conventional media the actions of anti-IS Islamic heroes. Honestly and candidly address the challenges of violent Islamic extremism.
- b. Intelligence and Homeland Security: Invest in improvements in intelligence

- collection and sharing, appropriately loosen privacy protections, and insist on rigorous screening and documentation for persons crossing national borders.
- c. Cyber: Foster international cooperation and collaboration against IS and embrace, as appropriate, non-governmental actors like Anonymous
 - d. Military: Augment conventional strikes with enhanced international SOF activities against focused targets and persons.
 - e. Politically: Steel US and Western populaces for a long, tough fight. This will not be easy. Aggressively measure results along the 4 axes above and keep the public actively informed.

While difficult to craft and daunting to implement, only an integrated, international, whole-of-government/whole-of-Western society approach can succeed in the long run against IS and its ilk. At stake, as Cohen notes are fundamental rights of freedom of speech and religion, the equality of women, and, most essentially, the freedom from fear and freedom to think.

David Gomez

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC), FBI

On Friday, November 13th, a group of eight French nationals directed by a Belgian national of Moroccan descent simultaneously attacked three separate sites in Paris, including restaurants, a crowded nightclub, and a soccer match where French President François Hollande was in attendance. The resulting carnage left 129 dead and over 300 injured.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility. In the days following the attack, President Hollande declared war on ISIS and called upon the European Union to unite in its efforts to destroy ISIS.

Prior to the Paris attack, ISIS was not believed to have the external operational capability to execute a complex attack, and was not previously known for coordinating large-scale overseas attacks. ISIS was only believed capable of inspiring the occasional lone-wolf jihadist. But these attacks took place without any meaningful warning from France's usually exceptional foreign and domestic intelligence agencies. The ability of ISIS to operate undetected in France using French nationals who lived covertly among them for months is unsettling from an intelligence standpoint. The E.U. now realizes they have become ISIS's second front.

The manner in which the attack was planned and carried out is important and should not be discounted. Elements of the attack had the hallmark of a sophisticated and robust clandestine

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external operational capacity. While the attack itself exhibited planning and a covert ability not seen since al Qa'ida began its long decline; from a cyber perspective, operational security of the terror cell left much to be desired. Media reports indicate cell members routinely communicated on Facebook and other social media, creating a legacy network for future analysis. Cell phones that were carried on the mission, and discarded prior to the attacks, are now providing clues to other members of the cell, as well as to the discovery of several safe houses. Why none of this was discovered prior to the attacks will be the subject of inexhaustible review in the coming months.

What does this mean for U.S. homeland security's ability to prevent future large-scale, domestically launched, terrorist attacks? Unfortunately, for the U.S. it may mean having to return to a domestic war footing, as the F.B.I has indicated it has over 900 active cases across all 50 states into ISIS members and sympathizers. Absent a national resolve to develop exceptional cyber and human intelligence and surveillance capability, the U.S. will once again fear indiscriminate terrorist attack, this time from ISIS.

Jennifer Hesterman

*CCHS Senior Fellow;
Advisor, Watermark Risk Management International*

The brutal attacks in Paris by ISIS not only illustrate the group's capability to clandestinely plan and soundly execute a complex operation, but exemplify the forced redrawing of battlefield lines. Civilian fatalities in conflicts steadily climbed from five percent at the turn of the century to more than ninety percent in modern day conflicts. Places where citizens once felt safe -- where they worship, study and recreate -- are now part of the warzone. These soft target attacks against civilian-centric, loosely defended sites are a breach of moral boundary that is shocking and causes a ripple effect of fear, two primary goals of terrorist groups. For democracies adhering to the Geneva Conventions that protect, not target, noncombatants, we are intellectually unwilling to imagine an enemy who doesn't share what we believe to be universally accepted moral codes, and therefore have a collective and severe blind spot adding to our vulnerability. Hardening against soft target attacks is not accomplished merely through physical security, but starts with self -- first wrapping our minds around the fact we are all targets, and the places we frequent are vulnerable to attack.

Additionally, civilians are not only the target, but the new first responder. As witnessed in Paris and other recent soft target attacks abroad, they are left to protect themselves, administer medical care to wounded and even engage the attackers before law enforcement arrives at the scene. The populace is often not fully informed about the intensity of the threat, or threat language is softened, with the

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good intention of not causing additional fear. However, education lessens fear. It empowers people to feel strong and confident, knowing they can protect themselves and their families. Understanding the threat, vulnerability and response, civilians can become force multipliers at the scene for first responders. The will to survive increases and their response in attack is more effective.

The picture of the pregnant woman hanging from the windowsill at the Bataclan Concert Hall is burned into our collective psyche. Instead of looking away from uncomfortable scenes of soft target attacks, we need to muster our strength to delve deeply. We are not helpless in the face of this rising threat; there are many lessons to learn, and actions we can take today to harden our country and ourselves from attack. Paris should serve as a wake-up call: we must replace denial with action.

Daniel Kaniewski

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Mission Area Director for Resilience and Emergency

Preparedness/Response, Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute

In the wake of the Paris attacks, U.S. authorities should seek to glean lessons from the European experience. This will ensure we are best prepared for similar threats against the U.S. homeland.

Several Federal departments and agencies are likely already individually focused on this task. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is examining the attackers' tactics and forensic evidence as part of its investigation in Paris. But the FBI is also likely considering how knowledge gained there could be employed by the Bureau to prevent future attacks here.

However, other agencies not directly involved in the Paris investigation may be less aware of the attacks' implications for their current security posture or longer-term considerations to close previously unknown security gaps.

Therefore President Obama should publicly direct his National Security Council to undertake a comprehensive review of the Paris attacks and report its findings to him in 30 days. This act of presidential leadership would ensure that the Federal government is best prepared to confront a Paris-style plot by synchronizing interagency efforts and ensuring that opportunities to enhance security are not overlooked. It would also send a clear message to the American public—and would-be attackers—that the Federal government is keenly focused on preventing an attack in the U.S.

There is precedent for a presidentially directed interagency review of a major incident. I was co-author of the *Federal Response Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, which we produced at the White House in the aftermath of that catastrophic disaster. I then oversaw the implementation of the report's 125 recommendations across the Federal government. And in the same way President Bush

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selected his homeland security and counterterrorism advisor Fran Townsend to lead that review, so too could the President direct his advisor Lisa Monaco to oversee this interagency effort.

I should note that while sensitive intelligence-related aspects of the final report should be classified, the Administration should strive to make most of the review's findings available at the "For Official Use Only" level. This would enable a wide distribution to state and local authorities. After all, in Paris it was the local first responders who confronted the attackers after they evaded detection by federal authorities.

Undertaking this review will ensure lessons from the Paris attacks are learned and not merely observed. Americans expect nothing less from their government.

John G. Kavanagh

*CCHS Senior Fellow;
Managing Director, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP*

The recent bombing attacks in Paris do not change how the U.S. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities (IC) are approaching ISIS within CONUS, but highlight intelligence gaps that threaten our National Security.

Since ISIS first came on the scene and commenced the targeting of American citizens for killing and active recruitment within the United States, the ISIS threat became a priority for the FBI, who has primary jurisdiction in the investigation and disruption of terrorist activities within the United States and its territories. What the Paris attacks have done is put to the forefront the National Security threats to and intelligence gaps in the United States and all nations considering taking in thousands of refugees that are fleeing Syria and the Middle East – specifically, [how can these refugees be properly vetted](#) for their nexus to terrorism when the data points or intelligence necessary to properly vet these immigrants does not exist.

FBI Director James Comey [told the House Judiciary Committee last month](#), " *We have improved dramatically our ability as an interagency -- all parts of the U.S. government -- to query and check people... Our ability to touch data with respect to people who may come from Syria may be limited... The data we had available to us from Iraq from our folks being there... is richer than the data we have from Syria.* "

To put Director Comey's statement in context, one just has to compare the lack of on-the-ground intelligence that presently exists regarding ISIS with the intelligence the US Intelligence Community,

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DoD, and the FBI had when dismantling ISIS's predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq. During the last Gulf War in 2004, then FBI Director Robert Mueller commenced an unprecedented joint FBI-DOD operation where hundreds of highly experienced Special Agent investigators worked side-by-side with Department of Defense personnel in war torn Iraq for the primary mission of the neutralization of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his terrorist organization, while preventing any terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States. Besides participating in the interrogation of all captured terrorists on the battlefields, FBI Special Agents and DoD personnel worked in the collection of biometrics of all terrorists in captivity, the execution of intelligence gathering Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) operations, the rescue of all foreign kidnapping victims, and the interviews of Saddam Hussein and all leaders of the Baath Party. In addition, Special Agent Bomb Technicians were part of the Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell where all IEDs were dismantled and sent back to the newly formed FBI Laboratory, Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), to identify the bomb makers and collect biometrics. Computer systems were created to link the DoD biometrics collection program with the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS), thus establishing a robust database of biometrics and intelligence of every terrorist captured by US forces in Iraq.

The FBI capitalized on real time intelligence and were able to successfully resolve all threats to United States by implementing a system in which any threat information taken from the battlefield that pertained to the United States, which included all United States telephone numbers found in the cellular telephones, pocket litter, or computers of the terrorist, was immediately relayed to FBIHQ, Counterterrorism Division, who would assign these leads or investigations to the appropriate FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force located throughout the United States and ensure that this threat was resolved.

Due to the US military's presence in Iraq, Abu Zarqawi and his terrorist organization was effectively neutralized and the country was able to stabilize. The joint FBI-DoD proactive, threat based, and intelligence driven approach to Al Qaeda in Iraq prevented them from launching any attacks against the U.S. homeland and prohibited them from being able to effectively recruit American citizens to join their cause. Unfortunately, when this administration pulled American forces from Iraq, it greatly destabilized the region and allowed for ISIS to gain strength and become a serious threat. The lack of an FBI-DoD presence also prevented the collection of the necessary intelligence to dismantle ISIS, and the biometrics necessary to identify those terrorists who may attempt to flee the region and commit acts of violence in America and Western Europe. This has also forced the FBI to become reactive instead of proactive in confronting the ISIS threat within the United States. This tremendous intelligence gap is a threat to our national security as seen from the lack of the ability to

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vet those hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the Middle East. It is especially disturbing that ISIS will use this exodus as an opportunity to penetrate America for future operations.

Nathan Lesser

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Deputy Director, National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

I was surprised by a common reaction to the tragic events in Paris last week – that new legislation is needed to ensure law enforcement can access encrypted information on cell phones and other devices. Many politicians, policy makers, and pundits have spent a remarkable amount of the time discussing the technical capabilities the terrorists used to communicate, plan, and carry out their attacks. Unfortunately, those quick to suggest policy changes appear to be doing so without the benefit of talking with experts in the field.

I am particularly disappointed in those who have seized on these tragedies as an opportunity to reinvigorate the debate over the use of encryption in commercial products. While we are still waiting on reliable facts about the technologies the terrorists used in Paris, there is no question amongst the experts that creating back doors in the use of encryption will harm only those acting in good faith. [Bob Sullivan, author and tech skeptic writes](#), “Meanwhile, creation of backdoors would make us all less safe. Would you trust governments to store and protect such a master key? Managing defense of such a universal secret-killer is the stuff of movie plots.”

A year ago, iPhones (and many Android phones) were updated with encryption that precluded the manufacturer or service provider (e.g. Apple, Google, AT&T) from accessing the majority of the phone’s data and communication. This change simultaneously helped protect users from malicious attacks and made it nearly impossible for law enforcement, even with a warrant or court order, to access phone information through the technology provider. After much debate, the administration decided last month not to ask technology companies to weaken their use of encryption in order to provide a back door for law enforcement.

This was an example of policy makers listening to experts. From a technical perspective, it makes a lot of sense. For starters, as Mr. Sullivan points out, any type of back door creates a vulnerability for malicious actors to exploit, making it more likely that user information will be compromised. Also, permitting such back doors would create a parity problem. Other countries are likely to require the same back door capability, even making it a condition of doing business in their country.

Most importantly, however, back doors won’t solve the law enforcement challenge. Back doors aren’t likely to affect malicious users. Despite the fact that mobile application market places (the Apple App

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Store, Google Play, Samsung Galaxy Apps, etc.) screen applications before accepting them, there are many available mechanisms for modifying a phone's operating system and installing unauthorized applications. This practice is known as "jail breaking." Some of the unapproved applications available on jail-broken phones encrypt data so that it's outside the reach of manufacturers and law enforcement, even if the government mandates the availability of back door access.

These are among the problems that experts continue to highlight. In July, fourteen preeminent security experts published a [paper](#) concluding that governments cannot demand "exceptional access" without imperiling the security of the digital world.

The Paris attacks were a horrific tragedy. Certainly, the law enforcement community needs tools to be able to address the growing sophistication of criminals and terrorists. However, knee-jerk responses, devoid of appropriate expert vetting, do not serve our national or global security interests. Policy makers need to define our national priorities and enlist experts in the work of creatively implementing them. Only through this kind of collaboration can we hope to have the tools that will enable a safer, more prosperous, and secure world.

Ronald Marks

CCHS Board Director;

President and Senior Partner, Intelligence Enterprises, LLC

Former officer, Central Intelligence Agency

In 1974, military science fiction author Joe Haldeman wrote a story called "The Forever War" about an endless interstellar conflict between two fundamentally differing civilizations. Western countries are currently fighting such a war with Islamic extremism. It is not likely to end anytime soon and it will see a continued ramp up in violence on both sides.

The ISIS attacks in Paris were not overly sophisticated. Simultaneous execution, explosive vests and mass shootings with AK-47's are not new technologies or techniques. What is new is that they are now being engaged outside the Middle East and South Asia. And for Westerners, unused to these kinds of attacks, it is justifiably upsetting. ISIS knows this and knows they do not need the massive attacks of Al Qaeda to make their point.

Another new aspect of this war is the use of encryption. Snowden revelations or not, there was a certain inevitability in the use of free encryption from the Internet. ISIS is far more familiar with the use of modern communication techniques than an Al Qaeda still buried in 1990's technology involving cellphones and personal, face-to-face communication.

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The effects of this ramp-up of terrorist tactics by ISIS are already being felt in the U.S. We are already reinforcing our “guns, guards, and gates” approach to security. No doubt we are also increasing our electronic surveillance as well. However, there is no such thing as 100 percent security, and an ISIS Paris-like attack in America is a near certainty and they know it. How we react to it is something else.

Like it or not, Paris is going to be the new normal. And we in the West are going to face an increasingly smart enemy who learns from its mistakes and is willing to sharpen and raise its terrorism levels in response to our reactions.

Our reactions to these attacks are important to the Forever War. We must understand that this clash will last for decades. We need to strengthen our resolve and stick with what we say; these brutal, cruel terrorist acts and this so-called ISIS ideology are not tolerable either here or in the entire Muslim world. We cannot declare "redlines" and not enforce them. We cannot declare ends of war when the enemy is not done fighting. We cannot stop going about our daily lives. If we do so, then we have lost and they have won.

David McIntyre

*CCHS Senior Fellow;
Bush School, Texas A&M*

Interest in national and homeland security is cyclical. Nobody pays much attention to security until there is a big event, and then everybody wants to know why nobody was paying attention. Well, pay attention now, because an even bigger event than Paris or Mali is coming.

- We have an enemy who hates us because we exist. There may be opponents who hate our freedoms, or values, or policies overseas, or who are motivated by poverty and oppression. They may be assuaged by engagement and soft power. But we also have enemies who see our existence as an affront to their god. They are growing.
- They are enabled by global communications, transportation, distribution of scientific expertise, and the computer revolution. Soon they will be enabled by the biological revolution.
- Eventually they will acquire the chemical, radiological, nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction experts have been warning about for two decades.
- When they get such weapons, they will use them. They must. Failure to do so would delegitimize their leaders now attracting volunteers by promising to destroy the West.
- We are unprepared for such attacks. We have some domestic forces dedicated to WMD response – a few hundred National Guard troops here, and a few thousand active duty troops there. But we are unprepared legally, bureaucratically, scientifically, and psychologically for an attack that kills tens of thousands and destroys the ability of the government to govern.

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This is the “Austin or Boston” threat.

The entire structure of emergency response in the US is built upon the principle of local leadership. Mayors and county officials make key decisions and use their resources until exhausted. Then governors and state officials supply resources and guidance. When that fails, the federal government steps in with resources, but the locals remain in charge. *At no point do the feds take over from the locals.*

Responding to a major WMD attack would require massive resources, lots of practice, and if an entire state government were destroyed (as with a nuclear weapon in Austin or Boston), some mechanism to control the response and restore the state and local government. We do not have such mechanisms today. We have not even thought seriously about establishing them.

We need to do that right now while everyone is paying attention. And before our opponents gain the weapons they seek, and use them in the ways they promise.

Brian Nussbaum

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Assistant Professor of Public Administration, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs, SUNY at Albany

ISIS has been engaged in appalling violence in Syria and Iraq. From beheadings, to crucifixions, to the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot – all captured on film and posted to the internet for a global audience. This merciless violence has been in addition to horrors that have been documented by journalists and human rights workers rather than by ISIS; from massacres to mass kidnapping to sex slavery. [The Global Terrorism Database \(GTD\) at the University of Maryland lists](#) more than ten individual ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria that have killed more than 100 people; ten of the more than 1600 attacks GTD attributes to ISIS in the last several years.

This year, there have been three attacks by ISIS that have killed over 100 people outside Syria and Iraq. Attacks that kill more than 100 people are uncommon; the 7/7 attacks in London and the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya did not hit that level. [According to the GTD](#), only about 150 incidents in their database of 140,000 attacks have resulted in more than 100 fatalities. ISIS is in rarefied and awful company.

The massacres in Paris, the March suicide bombings targeting mosques in Yemen, and the bombing of the Russian jetliner all killed more than 100; this in addition to a host of other major attacks that ISIS has committed outside its area of control. [The New York Times reports](#) ISIS attacks have occurred in

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France, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Turkey and Kuwait. Not only has ISIS begun a campaign of mass casualty attacks outside Iraq and Syria, they've begun to export their hyper-violence around the region and around the world. In fact, [the Times estimates](#) that ISIS has now likely killed over one thousand civilians outside Iraq and Syria.

ISIS has begun to metastasize from a regional threat to a global one. It is time for a global response.

B.J. Penn

*CCHS Board of Directors;
President, Genesis IV Executive Consulting*

Against the background of the Paris attacks, the following are key requirements:

- Intelligence sharing between our international partners;
- Regular cooperation between domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies despite different focus (e.g., prosecution vs. prevention);
- Capacity of the American public to tolerate increased surveillance in order to enhance public safety; and
- Cooperation between telecommunications companies and app developers to work with the U.S. Government (USG) on encryption that permits USG limited access.

Clifton E. Rodgers, Jr.

*CCHS Senior Fellow;
Executive Director, Real Estate Information Sharing and Analysis Center*

THE PARIS ATTACKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR US REAL ESTATE

"We have seen the combative spirit of the people roused, and not quelled..."
– Winston Churchill

We begin the holiday season with a series of brutal terrorist attacks overseas. Terrorists endeavor to utilize the element of fear to disrupt our lives and undermine our way of life. Yet, for most of us, it is business as usual.

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There is no need to rehash here the series of events splashed across the news over the past week. The French government and its brave citizens have risen to the occasion, taking resolute action to not only hunt down the perpetrators of the Paris attacks, but to launch air strikes against ISIL targets in the Middle East and send counter terrorism forces to respond to the hotel attack in the former French colony of Mali.

The attacks in Paris focused on “way of life” targets – restaurants and sports league operations – all with implications for real estate. Our civilization is largely housed by real estate. Those who oversee our pillars of commerce – hotels, office buildings, shopping malls – are already well aware of the potential threat posed by terrorism. Many of our own “way of life” targets are aligned with the above-mentioned groups and are equally prepared to respond and recover from incidents. Our vast information sharing networks – regional, national, private, public, sector by sector – are all working as designed. Through constructive engagement with law enforcement and intelligence services, real estate maintains a clear vision of the current threat environment and the dangers it faces.

For the US homeland, much has been done since the 9/11 attacks to create as resilient and vigilant a response as possible to the threat of terrorism. The general public sees some of this, but much of it is carried out behind the scenes. From an economic perspective, Congress wisely chose to extend the Nation’s terrorism risk insurance program as the first public law of the new year, thus ensuring economic resilience should another major attack occur.

Many of our “way of life” facilities have already increased the presence of security personnel and enhanced their surveillance activities. Nonetheless, our work continues to enhance the Nation’s security – particularly during the holiday season.

Javier Ruperez

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Former Ambassador (Spain); President, Ruperez International, LLC

There was a time when terrorism was simply a “tactical nuisance”. 9/11 changed that perception into a “strategic threat”. There was a time when terrorists were simple “non-state agents”. The Taliban’s Afghanistan was something else: a terrorist haven. Now we have trodden into unknown territory where the “strategic threat” does not come from faceless individuals but from a State called Islamic. To deny both attributes would please the world’s political correctness while hiding the basic element for a successful counteroffensive: to look straight into the truth of reality. That accommodation

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would deprive us of drawing the appropriate conclusions and prevent us from taking the right course of action.

The Islamic State has all the trappings of a proper State: a territory, a population, a system of finance, and an administrative set-up. Its bold terrorist actions can no longer be classified as a simple “nuisance” nor perfunctorily addressed as a problem of law and order. Its ability to threaten the stability and peace in the Middle East and far beyond has to be recognized as an act of State aggression and responded to accordingly by military means. While the reluctance to put “boots on the ground” is to be respected and understood, the failure to take prompt and adequate action against the clear and present danger would undoubtedly embolden the criminals, spread their threat and deepen the fear they induce. If possible, under the authority of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a large coalition of the willing, acting also in accordance with NATO’s and the EU’s mandates, should be the proper tool to put an end to the barbarians of the Islamic State. It is impossible to imagine how that coalition could take shape without the leadership of the USA.

The time for the well-meaning of the earth, those who prefer “violent extremism” to “Islamic terrorism” or the incomprehensible DAESH to the self-proclaimed “Islamic State”, has faded into irrelevance. We have had New York, and Washington, and Madrid, and London, and Ankara, and Beirut, and Baghdad, and this year Paris. Twice. How many more can we endure without losing ground, and faith, and hope? There will be time to look into the “root causes” of terrorism and to carefully analyze the reasons why the “foreign terrorist fighters” are attracted by the touch of Islamic evil. Time is running short, though, for the urgent call of the day: to decapitate the most serious challenge Western civilization has had to endure in recent decades. Dithering was never a policy.

Jeffrey P. Sarnacki

CCHS Senior Fellow;

TL Emergency Services, Quicken Loans

Following the multiple attacks resulting in many victims in Paris, I found myself thinking about what I, a retired national security professional and current member of the private sector emergency management field could learn from these attacks. I am no longer in a position to effect national change from a policy perspective except for to write in this and other forums, but I can drive my company and my community to become better prepared to respond when evil strikes.

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We have become all too familiar with the headline such as

April 2, 2014 - 3 killed; 16 injured | Ft. Hood, Texas ,
April 15, 2013 - 3 killed; 264 injured | Boston, MA,
Sept. 16, 2013 - 12 killed, 3 injured | Washington, D.C. ,
Dec. 14, 2012 - 27 killed, one injured | Newtown, Conn,
July 20, 2012 – 12 killed, 59 wounded | Aurora, Colorado,
April 16, 2007 – 32 killed, 17 wounded | Blacksburg, VA

This list is just an example of the problem facing America and we also know that this trend is increasing in frequency and often results in the passing of innocent victims whose death may have been preventable by immediate blood loss control and airway management.

[According to the United States Government](#), an active shooter is “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area (see also: DoJ/FBI: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents>; DHS:<http://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness>; FEMA: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33597>; DoE: <http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oese/oshs/rem-s-k-12-guide.pdf>).

Some [sources indicate](#) that there have been 160 active shooter incidents in the United States occurring between 2000 and 2013 accounting for the injury or deaths of over 1000 citizens; with the online Mass Shooting Tracker indicating 325 mass shooting this year alone. How can we as private citizens help our nation be better prepared?

We have known, largely as a result of our military combat experiences what Col. H.M. Gray stated in 1919, that “The hemorrhage that takes place when a main artery is divided is usually so rapid and so copious that the wounded man dies before help can reach him”. The fact is that arterial hemorrhage is a treatable health crisis, and the amount of preventable deaths that result from bleeding out is within the power of emergency managers to decrease.

Over 60 percent of these mass shootings end before the police arrive on the scene. This means, that in the majority of these events, professional medical care is not provided until after the event is over.

The planning for and the use of a few simple and inexpensive tools, and the active engagement of bystanders, can have significant impact on victim outcomes.

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These types of events frequently can leave numerous people physically unharmed or slightly injured who are then the very first response to any mass casualty event. These bystanders are the key in saving lives prior to the arrival of trained first responders.

The workplace has all too often become the place where these active shooter events take place, with the motivations for these events ranging from disgruntled employees to domestic violence that spreads from the home to work as well as other and mental health related reasons.

While uncomfortable to talk about, government and the business community alike must begin the process of preparing individuals to respond to emergencies, much like we taught children of the 60's to prepare for a nuclear attack, with "Duck and Cover" or "Bert the Turtle." This can be done through online education, in-school training, community outreach and other engagement.

FEMA like its predecessor Civil Defense, needs to create and engage with the citizens to educate them on bystander involvement and proper response to events that leave others injured. By creating educational opportunities and low cost or free access to lifesaving tools such as combat application tourniquets the nation will be much better prepared to respond to active shooter and terrorist attacks as well as mass casualty incidents like Paris.

Scott Somers

*CCHS Senior Fellow;
Phoenix Fire Department*

The Paris terror attack has captivated the world with the ferocity of violent extremists, and is reminiscent of Mumbai years earlier. As evidenced by these attacks, the tactics and logistics of non-state terrorists have become increasingly sophisticated. Protecting American cities requires equally sophisticated equipment, communications, and coordination for first responders.

Proper equipment essential. Paris, like Mumbai, is a new model for terrorism against soft targets using military-style weapons and explosives. The successful counter-assault by French security forces demonstrates the need for properly equipped police.

A key source of specialized equipment for U.S. police is the DoD 1033 Program. Equipment acquired through the 1033 Program was used in the response to the Boston Marathon bombing. But there is a backlash in the U.S. against programs that seemingly support "militarization" of police.

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The Administration and Congress must work closely with local leaders to ensure law enforcement has access to equipment that is essential for public safety. Likewise, police have the responsibility to be judicious in the application of this equipment.

Communication is critical. Paris and Mumbai stunned authorities not only for their sophisticated tactics, but the use of modern communications technology to plan and coordinate attacks. Yet, many of our first responders still cannot communicate across disciplines.

FirstNet is a nationwide effort to provide a public safety broadband network for communications and data sharing. But efforts are slow. FirstNet must work with states, cities, and first responders, to identify their needs when it comes to cost, coverage, and network access. Mobile device manufacturers need to be engaged to ensure the availability and affordability of public safety communications technology.

Surveillance and information sharing. There were clues emerging about a potential threat to Paris. Yet, French security services were not able to piece together information from Belgium, Germany, and non-governmental sources, such as Eye on the Homeland, to detect the threat.

Following 9/11, fusion centers were established to collect, analyze, and share threat information among federal, state, and local authorities and private sector partners. A 2013 House Homeland Security Committee report noted nearly 200 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force investigations created as a result of information provided through fusion centers. More recently, however, fusion centers have come under scrutiny with an eye toward budget cuts.

Fusion centers play an important role in countering violent extremism. Congress must warrant sustainable federal financial support for fusion center functions that provide a direct benefit to national interests.

Todd Stein

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Lawyer, Kitchens New Cleghorn, LLC

The attacks in Paris demonstrated yet again that military and counterterrorism responses will never be enough to stop Islamist terrorism. Why? Because ISIS, their predecessors, and their inevitable progeny are waging a war inspired by their ideals no matter how abhorrent those ideals are. Just as

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importantly, they know what victory based on those ideals looks like and they don't care how long it takes to win.

In contrast, the US and our allies have limited our definition of victory to destroying ISIS, the latest but not the last iteration of a global Islamist terrorist organization, and generally preventing the next attack. Unless and until the US leads this fight with our ideals to complement our military and counterterrorism efforts and defines victory in terms of our ideals marginalizing theirs, there will almost certainly be more Islamist terrorists and more attacks like Paris.

How do we do accomplish that?

By making religious freedom – specifically the right to practice one's religion without fear of persecution or harm – the cornerstone of our foreign and national security policy and by leveraging all instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic, and when necessary military – to protect and promote religious freedom throughout the Middle East, Europe and anywhere else Islamist terrorism may find a home.

Why religious freedom? First because religious freedom is completely inconsistent with the ideology Islamist terrorists are peddling to recruit and radicalize fighters. If you believe in religious freedom, you can't believe in their version of 7th Century Islam. And in a war without rules, battlefields, or uniforms, forcing individuals, communities, and countries to take sides in that debate makes it easier to identify who the enemy is.

Second, leading with religious freedom allows us to remain true to our values and allows us to address the religious component of the Islamist ideology without worrying about driving more Muslims toward extremism. For too long, the response to Islamist terrorism has been handicapped by the bipartisan unwillingness to confront Islamist ideology for fear of playing into the terrorist narrative that the West is at war with Islam.

And third, Muslims have always been considered to be the most credible voices in rejecting extremism. Championing religious freedom allows Muslims of all levels of religiosity to practice their religion as they like while empowering them to reject Islamist ideology and the violence it supports. In a sense, the terrorists have it right that the ideological war they started is a religious one. But instead of a war between religions as they would like; it should be a war between religious intolerance and religious freedom and the sooner the US and its allies frame the fight that way, the sooner we will begin to win.

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Ronald D. Taylor

CCHS Senior Fellow;

President, Center for Strategic Leadership in Complex Environments

Today's world is turbulent, networked, highly digital and becoming more complex. Remote entities and small groups now threaten, plan, and attack public sites with little advance warning and deadly outcomes. The recent attacks in Paris and Mali show the impact of coordinated attacks from determined terrorists.

Our value system is under attack and must be protected. Threats to the fabric of our society and the cultural values that underpin it are significantly more difficult to detect, identify, and protect against than conventional threats. Following the attacks on public spaces in Paris, the world community reacted in solidarity with the French, displaying the tricolor, mourning the losses, and supporting French actions on behalf of liberty, equality, and fraternity. This unintended but united response shows global support for a clearly articulated set of values that all believe must be preserved. Defeating terrorist groups that attack our value system, such as ISIS, demands we articulate, preserve and protect the values and norms we consider essential to life.

Governments alone can no longer protect us and need our help. CIA Director, John Brennan, recently said that the fight against terrorism “is not something that the Government can handle by itself alone. There are not enough resources to anoint everyone to be a Government intelligence, law enforcement, or security officer. There needs to be responsibilities on the part of individual actors in the private sector and individual citizens. This is a feature of our times.” In crisis situations, those on scene must respond quickly to save lives *before* local, state, or federal officials arrive. Enterprise leadership, and private sector safety and security professionals throughout industry must ensure that the advance preparation across all sectors is sufficient to help prevent massive death and destruction until government officials arrive.

Enterprises can no longer focus solely on profit or mission objectives, but must build safety and security objectives into enterprise plans. Enabling industry and other enterprises to accept more responsibility for safety and security objectives is a large undertaking. System-based approaches exist today that can provide strategic plans and business solutions to safeguard lives, maintain dependable infrastructures, maintain strong social cultures, and enable the enterprise to meet its mission goals and prosper.

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Ginger Turner

CCHS Senior Fellow;

Senior Economist and Vice President, Swiss Re

During the past few days, many people have asked me what structures are in place to compensate for these attacks – that is, whether terrorism insurance or government relief have been triggered in France or would be in place if the same thing happened on American soil.

While the tragic series of explosions and shootings left over 130 people dead across Paris, property losses from the attacks have not been significant from a financial loss perspective. Such financial losses would be covered by the state-backed terrorism risk pool, the Paris-based Gestion de l'Assurance et de la Réassurance des Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme (GAREAT). Since 2001, this public-private partnership has provided a co-reinsurance pool for sharing commercial terrorism risk (not including personal insurance such as individual home or auto). The first layer of 400 million euros is shared between 105 members, pro-rated to their share of ceded business. The second layer up to 2 billion euros is provided by private insurers and reinsurers. Beyond 2 billion euros, the French government provides an unlimited guarantee through the state-owned reinsurance company *Caisse Centrale de Réassurance* (CCR). Premiums are shared between the pool (52%), reinsurance (36%), and the CCR (12%). This sort of financial protection for catastrophic losses is important to allow the economy to continue operating even under the extreme uncertainty introduced by terrorist threats. Without such financial protection, for example, many large construction projects or events could not take place.

Around the world, most countries facing terrorism risk already have government programs either proposed or in place. Such programs usually develop after a large terrorism event, therefore reflecting each country's unique political and historical situation. On the international spectrum, the U.S. program reflects a middle ground of public and private involvement. First established after 9/11 and renewed most recently at the beginning of 2015, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) provides an important government "backstop" to support the private insurance industry in offering terrorism coverage. Although this cannot resolve safety and security fears, it provides an important support for economic activity and business operations to continue in the face of terrorism risk.

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It is not clear that we have a real strategy for degrading much less defeating ISIS, but their strategy against us is all too clear. Their strategic blows against the United States and the Free World will not be in Syria or Iraq. They will be in the capitals of the West. And Paris is only the latest, not the last.

It's the job of intelligence to warn what may happen, to identify what is happening, to help figure out what can be done, and do all of this before it is too late. That job was difficult enough before Snowden made off with America's secrets and taught the terrorists how to hide so NSA couldn't find them. It's even more difficult now that Congress has learned exactly the wrong lesson and cut back on NSA's ability to help keep us safe.

If you want to know who the terrorists are talking to, you've got to check the phone logs. But in order to check the phone logs, you have to have the phone logs. So after 9/11, NSA acquired those logs – multibillions of transactional digits – from the phone companies, who otherwise would have dumped them.

Yet thanks to some carefully orchestrated leaks and a not-so-subtle propaganda campaign, people came to believe – mistakenly – that NSA was listening in on Americans' phone calls. Now Congress has prohibited NSA from storing that metadata – making the process for identifying terrorist connections much slower. Maybe too slow.

If British spies had been using cellphones to call conspirators in London or Toronto do you think General Washington would have said hands off, we can't track those calls? Do you think the colonists would have objected? Or would they have volunteered to be part of the vast metadata haystack to help find the spies?

Each generation of Americans has an obligation to advance our continuing experiment in democracy. It is not enough to assert our individual liberties. Our responsibility as citizens also requires empowering government to act to keep us safe, subject to the checks and balances of our constitution.

We mourn for Paris and ask: will we be able to obtain the intelligence we need to keep America safe? Or to defeat the evil that radical Islamists represent? What to do about NSA's authorities may be the first clear test of empowering our limited government to act in cyberspace; it will not be the last.

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