Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies
Statement by Frank J. Cilluffo before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission)
HSPI & Cybersecurity Initiative Director Frank Cilluffo testified on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, in a hearing before the U.S.
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.
While different countries may employ different means and mechanisms that best correspond to the specific circumstances and conditions that prevail in each Member State, our fundamental goals and objectives are shared—namely to thwart terrorists and terrorism committed against innocent individuals and populations.
The cyber threat comes in various shapes, sizes, and forms. The bar to entry is low to launch a relatively rudimentary, but still potentially damaging, cyber-attack. The threat spectrum ranges from nation-states plus their proxies, to foreign terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates and information brokers, to hacktivists, to ankle-biters operating out of their parents’ home.
Our borders are now more porous in character than ever. Consider cyberspace, where traditional conceptions of border security simply do not translate. In a domain without traditional physical checkpoints, our adversaries can cloak themselves in anonymity and seek to do us harm, often without tipping off the target or stepping foot into that country.
The Department of Homeland Security: An Assessment of the Department and a Roadmap for its Future (PDF)
Al Qaeda (AQ) has been a shrewd practitioner of the art of stoking, piggybacking upon, and exploiting local grievances in order to further AQ’s own goals and objectives and the broader global jihad. In a military context, this is referred to as tactical, operational and strategic “swarming”; and it has been adopted by others as well, as recent incidents around the globe have demonstrated.
Al Qaeda’s Senior Leadership is back on their heels; key leaders have met their demise including Usama Bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. Nevertheless, the ideology that Bin Laden and others, such as the culturally fluent American-born extremist and self-styled cleric al-Awlaki, have propounded lives on. This ideology is the lifeblood that continues to sustain the vitality and growth of the global jihadist movement.
Iran and proxies have long had the United States in their crosshairs. Up until 9/11, in fact, it was Iran’s chief proxy, Hezbollah, that held the mantle of deadliest terrorist organization, having killed more Americans up to that point than any other terrorist group.
India and the United States share similar histories in regard to homeland security events and counterterrorism practices. Two tragic and catastrophic events, the September 11 attacks in the United States and the “26-11” Mumbai attacks in India, illuminated previously unseen homeland security issues and refocused each nation’s strategic consciousness.
Moving Beyond the First Five Years: Evolving the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to Better Serve State, Local, and Tribal Needs (PDF)
Officials at the state, local, and tribal levels and their counterparts in the private sector are often the first preventers and responders to terrorism and other security threats. Timely, accurate and well-informed intelligence and information products, shared vertically and horizontally with all responders at all levels of government, are more important than ever in order to inform them about threats, solutions and responses.
Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 Implementation: An Examination of FEMA's Preparedness and Response Mission (PDF)
Preparedness at all levels of government prior to an incident is important because any one broken “link” in the response “chain” imperils the national response system. When the system fails, as it did during Hurricane Katrina, the responsibility of managing the incident falls solely to those near the incident site – usually the first responders.
Though it is difficult to quantify, the potential for religious radicalization of U.S. prison inmates poses a threat of unknown magnitude to the national security of the United States – a threat that poses serious consequences regardless of its magnitude.